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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF DELAY AND PROBABILISTIC DISCOUNTING ON GREEN
CONSUMERISM
Blake J. Bent
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. Philip Langlais

People have a tendency to discount outcomes that are delayed or probabilistic. In other words,
people will sacrifice larger benefits for smaller benefits that are immediate or certain. For many
environmentally-friendly (“green”) products, the financial benefits are both delayed and
probabilistic. The current study examined how delay and probability, as well as frame and
magnitude, influenced consumers’ decisions when comparing a conventional and green product.
Participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and completed one of two
experiments. In each experiment participants chose between a conventional product (low initial
cost, high operating cost) and green product (high initial cost, low operating cost). Magnitude
was manipulated by randomly assigning participants to a light bulb (low magnitude) or water
heater (high magnitude) condition. Within each magnitude condition, promotional messages
highlighted the increased operating cost of the conventional product (loss frame) or decreased
operating cost of the green product (gain frame). Probability was manipulated in experiment one
and inferred by the participant in Experiment 2. Results supported the recent finding that delay
and probability interact. When probabilities of savings were high, participants were more likely
to select the green product. This finding occurred whether probabilities were manipulated
(Experiment 1) or inferred (Experiment 2). Framing and magnitude effects were inconsistent
across experiments. Marketers promoting green products should take steps to reduce perceived
risk associated with green products.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The current rate of climate change has the potential to produce devastating effects around
the world (IPCC, 2013). In light of this problem, consumers can make a lasting environmental
impact with their purchase decisions (Dietz, Gardner, Gilligan, Stern, & Vandenbergh, 2009).
According to a recent consumer survey by SC Johnson and the GfK market research firm (2011),
the majority of Americans believe that buying sustainable products is a key component of
alleviating environmental complications. However, the price of a product is still a barrier to the
purchase of green (i.e., eco-friendly, sustainable) products. The survey, which sampled a
representative portion of the population (i.e., controlling for age, gender, geographic region,
education, race, and income), found that 79% of respondents reported that financial incentives
influenced their decisions to help the environment; 49% rated financial incentives as a “major
influence.” Furthermore, 51% of respondents indicated that the unwillingness of consumers to
pay a premium for green products was a “major reason” for environmental problems (GfK,
2011). Finally, consumers’ willingness to pay a premium for green products has decreased in a
variety of categories. For example, the number of respondents willing to pay a higher price for
energy efficient automobiles or light bulbs decreased by more than 10% between 2008 and 2012
(GfK, 2012).
As the survey results indicated, consumers are cognizant of their impact on the
environment, but the cost of green products appears to be an obstacle to consumption. Many
green products, however, would actually save the consumer money over time. The cost of any
product can be broken down into two dimensions: initial cost (i.e., sticker price) and operating
cost. Combined, these dimensions make up a product’s life cycle cost (Kaenzig &Wustenhagen,
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2010). Green products vary on each of these dimensions relative to their conventional
counterparts but the focus of this proposed research is only on one segment of consumer
products: green products that have higher initial costs and lower operating costs compared to
their conventional counterparts. For example, compact fluorescent lights (CFLs) have a higher
sticker price than the equivalent incandescent bulbs. Over time, opting for CFLs will save the
consumer money in the form of lower utility bills and fewer replacement costs. If consumers
relied only on initial price to make decisions then incandescent bulbs would appear to be the
cheaper option. Alternatively, consumers who considered the life cycle cost of the product
would realize that CFLs are the most cost-effective option. Why, then, are consumers buying
fewer energy efficient light bulbs when this purchase carries a financial incentive (GfK, 2012)?
The current study used a discounting framework to explain why consumers forgo the
future financial benefits of green products and how consumers estimated the risks associated
with purchasing green products. A nomological network was developed which integrated these
factors, along with controllability and unrealistic optimism, to model the consumer decision
making process for certain green products (i.e., products with a high initial cost and low
operating cost).
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CHAPTER II
DELAY DISCOUNTING
Considering the lifespan of the product when making a purchase decision is what
economists and psychologists refer to as an intertemporal choice. Consumers must compare
different values at different points in time (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). In
the light bulb example, the consumer must decide if he or she wishes to pay a little now and a lot
later or a lot now and a little later. These sorts of intertemporal choices are well documented in
the literature and are associated with reliable trends in behavior. One of the general tenets of
intertemporal choice is that consumers discount future gains. That is, consumers judge future
gains to be less valuable than immediate gains. For example, Thaler (1981) found that
participants were indifferent between receiving $15 immediately and $20 after a delay of one
month. Introducing a one month delay discounted the value of $20. Numerous studies have
demonstrated similar patterns in decision making (for reviews see Frederick, Loewenstein, &
O'donoghue, 2002; Green & Myerson, 2010; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). In a purchase
decision between conventional and green products, delay discounting may manifest as a
preference for conventional products. A conventional product provides an immediate saving in
the form of a lower purchase price. The savings that are associated with green products are not
recouped until some point in the future. Delayed savings are not as valuable as immediate
savings and therefore consumers will opt for the conventional product.
Much of the research on discounting behavior has focused on the formulation of
mathematical models (for review see Doyle, 2013). Economists traditionally favored an
exponential model of discounting behavior (Samuelson, 1937) of the following form:
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Eq. 1:

V = Ae-kD

where V is the present (discounted) value of the delayed reward; A is the real value of the
delayed reward; e, Euler’s number, is a constant; D is the delay; and k is an individual’s
discounting parameter (i.e., a value that adjusts the function according to individual discount
rates). The exponential discount model assumes a constant discount function that produces
consistent discount rates over time. Note that a positive discount rate, k, changes the equation
into the more familiar continuously compounding interest formula. The exponential discounting
model calculates the decrease in value of a future reward rather than the increased value from
accrued interest.
An alternative to the exponential model is the hyperbolic model. Using the same notation
from the exponential model, the hyperbolic discounting function is modeled as shown:

Eq. 2:

V = A / (1 + kD)

The hyperbolic discounting function models a steep initial discounting and a leveling out over
time. In other words, a delay of time D has a substantial impact on subjective valuation when
people must choose between an immediate gain, t0 (time 0), and a gain at time t0 + D. Delay is
less impactful when the alternatives are both in the future (e.g., time t1 versus time t1 + D; t1 > 0;
Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). For example, Kirby and
Herrnstein (1995) found that participants, on average, preferred an immediate $21 to $25 after 10
days. However, participants’ preferred $25 in 37 days compared to $21 in 27 days. Note that
the delay, 10 days, is the same in both scenarios, but preferences shifted from the smaller sooner
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reward to the larger later reward when adding a constant delay to both rewards. The exponential
model is not able to account for this preference reversal. According to the exponential
discounting function, preferences at a given delay are not impacted by the timing of the delay. In
fact, multiple studies have confirmed that the hyperbolic discounting function is a better model
of human, and animal, decision making than the exponential function (Johnson & Bickel, 2013;
Kirby & Herrstein, 1995; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Mazur, 1988; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000).
Many discounting studies follow a similar indifference point paradigm. The indifference
point is the value at which a participant has an equal preference for an immediate or delayed
reward. For example, Thaler (1981) found that, on average, participants were equally satisfied
with receiving $15 immediately and $20 after a delay of one month. Participant indifference
points are elicited in one of two ways. In some cases (e.g., Chapman, 1996; Thaler, 1981)
participants completed a fill-in-the-blank task. They were required to indicate how much money
received immediately would make them indifferent to a given reward at a specific delay.
Alternatively, participants might be asked how much money received in the future would make
them indifferent to an immediate reward. In these studies participants are only required to
provide a single point estimate of their indifference point.
Other studies (e.g., Benzion, Rapoport, & Yagil, 1989; Estle et al., 2006; Kirby &
Marakovic, 1996) use an iterative decision procedure. As in previous studies, participants were
presented with a choice between a smaller sooner reward and a larger later reward. After the
initial selection, the value of one of the rewards is adjusted until the participant reverses his or
her preference from the immediate reward to the delayed reward (or vice versa). This procedure
is repeated until converging on an indifference point. A full description of this method is
presented in the method section below.
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The mathematical description of delay discounting has a long research history, yet
relatively little work has attempted to tackle the psychological underpinnings of delay
discounting. One of the leading explanations for discounting behavior states that humans have a
psychological need for closure. Hardisty, Appelt, and Weber (2013) refer to this need for closure
as present bias. This bias manifests itself as a desire for immediate outcomes. When given the
choice between an immediate reward and a delayed reward, the present bias influences the
preference for the immediate reward. Opting for an immediate reward allows decision makers to
“close the books” on this decision. Present bias is a theoretical explanation and empirical
evidence supports this account of discounting behavior. Hardisty et al. (2013) asked their
participants to choose between smaller immediate rewards and larger rewards to be received
after one year. Additionally, participants were instructed to list their thoughts when making
decisions. The thoughts were then categorized by content. In a mediation model, the proportion
of thoughts that were categorized as present-biased (e.g., “I like to manage situations that arise in
my life as quickly as I can” p. 353) was a significant predictor of discount rates. Other thought
categories such as investment interest (e.g., “I could deposit the immediate reward in an interest
earning account), future uncertainty (e.g., “I should take the money now because I don’t know
what the future holds”), and social norms (e.g., “Patience is a virtue”) were not significant
predictors of discount rates. Further evidence supporting the present bias description of delay
discounting comes from the finding that many people prefer to pay off larger losses immediately
rather than wait for a small discount (discounting of losses is discussed in more detail in the
following section).
Furthermore, Benhabib, Bisin, and Schotter (2010) posited that the influence of the
present bias has a small fixed effect on intertemporal choices. In other words, the immediacy of
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a reward is worth a fixed amount, regardless of the magnitude of the rewards. Based on
Benhabib et al.’s data, the present bias was estimated to be worth an average of four dollars. If
the difference between an immediate and delayed reward is less than four dollars, decision
makers will choose the immediate option. Alternatively, if the difference between the immediate
and delayed reward is more than four dollars then decision makers will choose to accept the
delay. Consumers who opt for conventional products over green products often exhibit behavior
consistent with a present bias explanation of delay discounting (Hardisty et al., 2013).
Conventional products provide an immediate reward in the form of a discounted initial price.
According to the present bias account, consumers will opt for the green product if it confers a
savings of more than four dollars. If the future savings associated with the green product are less
than four dollars, then the preference for immediacy is worth more than the future savings and
consumers will opt for the conventional product. However, these predictions have not been
empirically tested in the domain of green purchase decisions.
FRAMING AND MAGNITUDE EFFECTS FOR DELAY
Thus far, only positive outcomes have been considered. However, many financial
decisions are framed as losses. A framing effect occurs when behavior is altered by the
presentation of the outcomes. Deciding between two gains produces different decisions than
deciding between two losses. The savings linked with green products can also be framed as
losses or gains. Promotional messages can be worded to highlight the savings (i.e., gains)
associated with buying a green product or the cost (i.e., loss) associated with buying
conventional products. Decision making scholars agree that preferences are not stable across
time. Rather, preferences are constructed with each decision and are influenced by contextual
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factors (for review see Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). It follows that the framing of promotional
messages can influence purchase decisions.
Framing is a robust effect in decision making studies. Framing messages as losses or
gains have asymmetric impacts on perceived value. According to prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), humans will take risks to avoid a loss but will not
take those risks for additional gains. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) demonstrated the magnitude
of this effect in their classic “Asian disease problem.” Participants had to select between two
treatment options for an unusual Asian disease that was expected to kill 600 people. One group
of participants had to select between treatments in which (a) 200 people would be saved for sure
and (b) a one-third probability of saving all 600 and a two-thirds probability of saving no one. In
this condition, 72% of participants opted for treatment (a). The other group of participants had to
select between treatments in which (c) 400 people would die for sure and (d) a one-third
probability that no one would die and a two-thirds probability that all 600 people would die. In
this condition, 78% of participants opted for treatment (d). Note that the outcome in option (a) is
identical to option (c) and the outcome in option (b) is identical to option (d). Additionally, all
four treatments had identical expected values. The critical difference between the two conditions
was how the choices were framed. One group was deciding how many people to save (i.e., the
gain frame) and the other group was deciding how many people to let die (i.e., the loss frame).
Participants chose the certain option when choosing between gain scenarios but took risks when
choosing between loss scenarios. They were risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses.
Mathematical models of discount behavior predict that individuals prefer to delay losses
(e.g., Kirby & Marakovic, 1995). Recall that participants in one study were indifferent between
receiving an immediate $15 and $20 in one month (Thaler, 1981). In terms of losses, these same
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participants should be indifferent between paying $15 immediately and $20 in one month.
Closer examination reveals that choosing between $15 and $20 in one month has a
mathematically equivalent outcome in both a loss and gain frame. In the gain scenario, the
participant who opts for an immediate $15 is forgoing an additional $5 for the sake of receiving
money immediately. In the loss scenario, the participant who opts to pay $20 in one month is
forgoing an additional $5 for the sake of having money immediately. In other words, receiving
$5 should be identical to not paying $5.
However, research has indicated that losses and gains are not discounted in a symmetric
fashion (Estle et al., 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Thaler,
1981; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). In the discussion of gains, an increase in discounting refers
to an increased preference to receive money immediately. For instance, someone who is
indifferent between receiving $10 immediately and $20 in one month is displaying a steeper, or
greater, discounting rate than someone indifferent to $15 immediately and $20 in one month.
The person who is indifferent between an immediate $10 and delayed $20 is indicating that a one
month delay discounts the value of $20 by $10. In contrast, the person indifferent between an
immediate $15 and delayed $20 is only discounting the future value of $20 by $5. The effect of
immediacy is stronger in the former case compared to the latter. When discussing losses, a
higher discount rate refers to a stronger preference to delay payments. Someone indifferent
between paying $10 now and $20 in one month is displaying greater discounting than someone
indifferent between paying $15 now and $20 in one month. Discounting is greater for gains than
for losses (Chapman, 1996; Estle et al., 2006; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Shelley, 1994;
Thaler, 1981). In other words, the preference for immediate gains is greater than the preference
to delay losses. In Thaler’s (1981) experiment, participants were indifferent between receiving
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$15 immediately and $20 in one month. However, these participants were also indifferent
between paying $15 immediately or $16 in three months. An immediate gain was worth more
than a delayed loss.
Hardisty et al. (2013) found that present bias extends to losses as well. The need for
closure drives people to resolve losses. Some participants were even found to show negative
discounting. That is, these participants were willing to pay a premium for immediate closure.
The majority of experimental designs in previous research did not allow for negative
discounting. Models of discounting predict that people will sacrifice smaller immediate
payments for larger later payments. Paying a larger earlier amount appeared to have two
disadvantages: the payment is larger and earlier. Thus, most experiments did not include a
decision between a larger sooner payment and a smaller later payment. When Hardisty et al.
allowed for negative discounting they found that, on average, participants were indifferent
between paying $10 immediately and $9.42 in one year. This finding in particular lends
substantial support to the present bias explanation of discounting. People’s need for closure
superseded any potential economic benefits.
The present bias is able to explain the asymmetry between gains and losses because
present bias would enhance discounting for gains and mitigate discounting for losses. In the gain
frame, high discounting refers to a strong preference for immediacy. In the loss frame, high
discounting refers to a strong preference for delay. Present bias, the need to receive or pay
immediately, works in opposite directions in each frame.
Another factor which impacts discount rates is magnitude. Discount rates decrease as the
size of the reward increases. This change in rate can be illustrated in two equivalent ways: (a)
people are more willing to wait for large rewards than small rewards; or (b) in order to opt for a
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delayed reward, the ratio of delayed reward to immediate reward is higher for smaller rewards
than larger rewards. Numerous studies support this conclusion (Chapman, 1996; Chapman &
Winquist, 1998; Estle et al., 2006; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992;
Thaler, 1981). In one representative study, Kirby and Marakovic (1996) had participants choose
between immediate and delayed rewards of differing amounts. They found that, on average,
participants were indifferent between $15 immediately and $30 in 2.5 months while also
indifferent between $42.50 immediately and $85 in 7 months. The smaller reward was
discounted by one-half in 2.5 months, but the larger reward was discounted by one-half in 7
months; the discount rate is steeper for the smaller reward. If discount rates were independent of
magnitude then both amounts would lose half of their value after an equivalent delay (e.g.,
participants would be indifferent between $42.50 immediately and $85 in 2.5 months).
Framing effects interact with the magnitude of outcomes. Large gains are discounted less
than small gains, but large losses are discounted more than small losses (Estle et al., 2006;
Hardisty et al., 2013). That is, people will wait for large gains and prefer to receive small gains
immediately, but would rather pay off small losses immediately and postpone large losses.
These findings follow the predictions of the fixed cost present bias account of delay discounting
(Benhabib et al., 2010; Hardisty et al., 2013). If the present bias is worth four dollars then the
present bias is more influential for small gains and losses than large gains and losses.
DELAY DISCOUNTING AND GREEN PRODUCTS
Many studies cited thus far have applied delay discounting principles to simple monetary
decisions. However, the effects have been demonstrated in other domains. For example,
researchers have studied the impacts of delay discounting on specific populations such as
cigarette smokers (Reynolds, Richards, Horn, & Karraker, 2004), alcoholics (Petry, 2001),
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pathological gamblers (Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003), cocaine users (Heil, Johnson, Higgins,
& Bickel, 2006) and credit card users (Meier & Sprenger, 2010). Other studies have focused on
specific outcomes such as health decisions (Chapman, 1998), tipping behavior (Chapman &
Winquist, 1998), vacation alternatives (Foxall, Doyle, Yani-de-Soriano, & Wells, 2011), food
(Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2007; Odum & Rainaud, 2003), and consumer goods (Kirby &
Herrnstein, 1995).
The application of delay discounting to green purchase decisions has thus far not been
examined, although one study by Hardisty and Weber (2009) did examine delay discounting of
environmental outcomes. In this study, participants chose between smaller, sooner
improvements in air quality or larger, later improvements. Similar to studies with monetary
outcomes, delayed environmental benefits were discounted. The financial incentives of buying
green consumer products have not been empirically studied through a discounting framework.
Some green products and their conventional counterparts can be conceptualized as
smaller sooner rewards and larger later rewards. Note that the proposed study is limited in scope
to green products which have a higher initial cost but lower operating cost compared to
conventional products. In turn, green products produce savings over time. The conventional
product provides immediate rewards (lower initial cost) and the green product provides a larger
reward but only after some delay. Furthermore, the messages used to promote green products
can be framed as gains by focusing on the financial incentives of green products (e.g., “Save
money over time by going green”) or as losses by focusing on the higher operating cost of
conventional products (e.g., “Pay higher utility bills with conventional products”). By
incorporating knowledge of delay discounting, coupled with framing and magnitude effects,
predictions can be made about how to best promote the adoption of green products.
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If magnitude is divided into two groups (low vs. high), then the interaction between
magnitude and framing (loss vs. gain) produces four possible promotional messages: the gain
frame for low magnitude products, the loss frame for low magnitude products, the gain frame for
high magnitude products, and the loss frame for high magnitude products. The research on the
framing and magnitude interaction found that people will wait for large gains and prefer to
receive small gains immediately, but would rather pay off small losses immediately and postpone
large losses (Estle, et al., 2006; Hardisty et al., 2013). Therefore, for low magnitude products
(e.g., light bulbs), a loss frame promotes the purchase of green products. For small losses,
people prefer to make payments immediately. Thus, a green product of low magnitude will
represent a small initial loss (i.e., a slightly higher initial cost) and consumers will opt to pay that
immediately. The gain frame for low magnitude products will promote the purchase of a
conventional product. Small gains are preferred immediately, so the savings associated with a
conventional product’s initial cost will be preferred. For high magnitude products (e.g., water
heaters), the loss frame promotes the purchase of conventional products. People prefer to
postpone large losses, and the expense associated with conventional products is not incurred until
after a delay. The gain frame for high magnitude products promotes the purchase of green
products. People are willing to wait for large gains, and the savings of going green are recouped
after a delay. A summary of these decisions can be found in Figure 1. Note that this figure only
refers to the effects of frame and magnitude in intertemporal choices. Other components will be
added to this figure in further sections.
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Magnitude

High

Low

Loss frame

Gain frame

Loss frame

Gain frame

Green

Conventional

Conventional

Green

Figure 1. Predicted product decisions based on the framing of promotional messages
(loss vs. gain) and magnitude of product cost (low vs. high). The last line represents
the consumer decision to opt for a green product or a conventional product.
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CHAPTER III
PROBABILISTIC DISCOUNTING
Another factor with the potential to influence green consumerism is probability. The
savings that result from buying green products are not guaranteed. For example, the financial
benefits of driving a hybrid vehicle are partially dependent upon the number of miles driven and
maintenance costs. Even if consumers are aware of the reduced life cycle costs of green
products, a degree of uncertainty is still present. Note that probabilistic choices refer to any
situation in which individuals are choosing between multiple options with varying degrees of
certainty. Although occasionally used interchangeably, the terms “risk” and “uncertainty” have
distinct meanings. Risk refers to situations in which the probability of an outcome is
known/given. Uncertainty refers to outcomes in which the probability is unknown (Tversky &
Fox, 1995).
In a similar way that immediate options are preferred to delayed options, certain options
are preferred to uncertain options when considering probabilistic choices. Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) found that 80% of participants preferred a certain $3000 over a gamble for
$4000 with an 80% success rate, even though the gamble represents a higher expected value.
Additionally, discounting increases as uncertainty increases (Green & Myerson, 2004). For
example, Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, and Wehr (2006) reported that participants were
indifferent between approximately 70,000 yen and a 90% chance of winning 100,000 yen. When
the probability of winning 100,000 yen decreased to 70%, participants were willing to accept
only 50,000 yen.
Probabilistic and delay discounting can both be modeled by similar mathematical
functions (Green & Myerson, 2004). These similarities have led many scholars to propose that
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delay and probabilistic discounting are the same process. Some have argued that probabilistic
discounting is a product of delay discounting. Rachlin, Raineri, and Cross (1991) postulated that
probabilistic choices are perceived as a series of gambles. In order to earn the payoff from an
uncertain gamble, that gamble would have to be played repeatedly. For example, consider two
separate gambles with different odds. One gamble has 9 to 1 odds while the other gamble has 19
to 1 odds. If individuals were to play each of these games repeatedly, the expected number of
gambles before a win is higher in the case of a gamble with 19 to 1 odds. Because each
successive gamble takes time, and one gamble is expected to pay off sooner than the other, the
differences in probability translate to a difference in delay. Rachlin and colleagues (1991)
argued that these differences in delay are truly the driving force behind probabilistic discounting
and that the two phenomena are part of the same process.
Others have suggested that uncertainty is the essential underlying factor. Having to wait
for a payoff increases the chances that unforeseen variables interfere with the payoff (Keren &
Roelofsma, 1995). According to this view, the effects of delay are being driven by the inherent
uncertainty that is associated with delay. Weber and Chapman (2005) found that, under certain
circumstances, the effects of delay and uncertainty are interchangeable: the effect of immediacy
is mitigated by added uncertainty and the effect of certainty is mitigated by added delay. These
findings support an equivalence of probability and delay, but are not able to suggest one of these
variables as the primary underlying mechanism.
Although the theories purporting an equivalence between delay and probability are
intuitively appealing, there is little consensus regarding the equality of the two phenomena
(Green & Myerson, 2004). Many studies have shown that framing and magnitude effects
(discussed in the next section) impact the delay and probabilistic discounting functions in
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separate ways (e.g., Chapman & Weber, 2006; Estle, Green, Myerson, & Holt, 2006; Shead &
Hodgins, 2009). Furthermore, fMRI studies have implicated separate neural pathways when
considering delayed versus probabilistic choices (Luhmann, Chun, Yi, Lee, & Wang, 2008;
Weber & Huettel, 2008).
FRAMING AND MAGNITUDE EFFECTS FOR PROBABILITY
Probabilistic choices can also be framed in terms of gains or losses (e.g., a certain $100
loss versus a 90% chance of a $110 loss and 10% chance of no loss) and are subject to the effects
of magnitude. Unlike delay discounting, magnitude effects for probabilistic discounting have
only been revealed in the gain frame; magnitude effects were tested in the loss frame but no
effect was observed. Studies have shown that large gains are discounted more than small gains
(Estle et al., 2006; Mitchell & Wilson, 2010; Shead & Hodgins, 2009). People prefer certain
gains when payoffs are large, but are willing to take risks when payoffs are smaller. These same
studies have also observed a main effect of frame, with losses discounted more than gains. In
sum, probabilistic losses are discounted more than probabilistic gains; large magnitudes are
discounted more than small magnitudes but only in the gain frame.
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CHAPTER IV
COMBINED EFFECT OF DELAY AND UNCERTAINTY
Purchases of green products involve the simultaneous consideration of delay and
uncertainty. The savings associated with buying green products are recouped over time and the
reward is not certain. Many studies have tested these discounting phenomena separately, yet
comparatively few studies have examined decisions with concurrent delay and probabilistic
elements. In a recent study, Vanderveldt, Green, and Myerson (2015) systematically varied five
levels of probabilistic outcomes across five delays and two magnitudes. Results from this study
indicated that delay and uncertainty combine multiplicatively. Probabilistic discounting was
steeper when delays were short rather than long, and the effect of delay was stronger when
probabilities of receiving a reward were high rather than low. In other words, as outcomes
approach certainty, the relative weight of delay discounting increases. As outcomes approach
immediacy, the relative weight of uncertainty increases. For certain outcomes, the choice
reduces to a delay discounting task. Conversely, for immediate outcomes, the choice reduces to
a probabilistic discounting task.
The majority of studies examining probabilistic discounting manipulate the level of risk
for a given outcome (e.g., Estle et al., 2006; Vanderveldt et al., 2015). Probabilities of success
are explicitly stated and participants must assume that these risk levels are accurate. Consumer
choices are rarely based on explicit levels of risk. Rather, the uncertainty associated with
possible outcomes is assumed to be imposed by the decision maker. For example, if a green
product promises to save the consumer money over time, there is a degree of uncertainty
concerning the likelihood that these savings will be realized. Consumers must apply their own
probability estimates in purchase decisions.
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DELAY AND PROBABILITY FOR GREEN PRODUCTS
Although recent work has shed light on the interaction between delay and probabilistic
discounting (Vanderveldt et al., 2015), the proposed model posits that the uncertainty associated
with green purchases is largely irrelevant and delay is the only important factor. This argument
is based on two critical factors: controllability and unrealistic optimism (see Figure 2). The longterm savings associated with many green products is partially the result of consumer interaction
with these products. For example, hybrid or electric automobiles can save consumers money by
reducing cost spent on gas. However, estimated savings are also dependent upon how a
consumer uses that product (e.g., hybrid vehicles will not be cost effective if the driver decides to
drive more frequently after purchasing the vehicle). Research has indicated that perceived
control mitigated the uncertainty associated with future losses (Carroll, Sweeny, & Shepperd,
2006; Gilovich, Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; Highhouse, Mohammed, & Hoffman, 2002).
Consumers’ perceptions of future monetary outcomes are related to their perceived control over
energy usage. Because consumers have control over their energy usage, outcomes become more
certain.
Furthermore, people are generally overconfident in their abilities. A classic study by
Svenson (1981), for example, found that nearly 90% of people in a group estimated that their
driving ability was higher than the median driving ability in the group. When individuals
estimate risk their assessments are more favorable for themselves than objective estimates or
estimates for peers (for review see Shepperd, Klein, Waters, & Weinstein, 2013; Weinstein,
1980). Additionally, people believe that negative events are more likely to happen to others than
to themselves and this effect is enhanced by perceived control (Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002).
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Unrealistic
Optimism

Controllability

Consumer
Uncertainty/Risk

Green Purchase
Decisions
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Figure 2. Proposed model of green purchase decisions. Controllability and unrealistic
optimism reduce the effect of uncertainty. Purchase decisions are ultimately a delay
discounting task. The outcomes of delay discounting are presented in the inset.
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In sum, risks associated with green products are not explicitly stated. Because consumers
construe their own level of uncertainty, their perceptions are subject to individual biases. The
perceived control over the outcome, along with a propensity for unrealistic optimism are
predicted to mitigate perceived uncertainty. When uncertainty is minimized, the interaction
between probabilistic and delay discounting is reduced to a simple delay discounting task
(Vandervedlt et al., 2015). Therefore, product messages should focus on the effects of delay
discounting.
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CHAPTER V
HYPOTHESES
Based on evidence from delay and probabilistic discounting, a number of predictions
were made regarding the purchase of green products (see Figure 2). Specific hypotheses follow.
H1:

a) When probability is high, the message frame and magnitude of the product’s
cost will interact. Specifically, when the magnitude is low (inexpensive), the
purchase of the green product will be more likely in the loss frame than the gain
frame.
b) When the magnitude is high (expensive), the purchase of the green product will
be more likely in the gain frame than the loss frame.

H2:

a) When probability is low, the purchase of the green product will be more likely
in the loss frame than the gain frame.
b) When probability is low, the purchase of the green product will be more likely
in the low magnitude gain condition than the high magnitude gain condition.

When taken together, hypotheses 1 and 2 can be summarized as a three-way interaction.
The interaction between frame and magnitude will vary across levels of probability.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that when probability was high and the products were relatively
expensive, more participants would prefer the green product in the gain frame than the loss
frame. Additionally, when probability was high and products were relatively inexpensive, more
participants would prefer the green product in the loss frame than the gain frame. High
probabilities approach certainty. Based on Vanderveldt at al.’s (2015) study, effects of
probability are reduced as probabilities approach 100%. Therefore, all the predictions in the high
probability conditions are based on the impact of frame and magnitude in delay discounting.
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When probability was low the loss frame was expected to elicit the selection of the green product
across magnitudes. Participants would opt for the conventional product in the gain frame, but
the effect would be stronger at higher magnitudes.
H3: When probability levels are not explicitly stated, participants will have high
confidence in their ability to save money.
H4: Results of Experiment 2 will mimic the high probability conditions of Experiment 1.
In other words, hypotheses 1a and 1b should apply to Experiment 2.

These effects were empirically tested in two experiments. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were
tested in Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, participants chose between a conventional product
(low initial cost, high operating cost) and green product (high initial cost, low operating cost).
The future outcomes were framed as losses (i.e., increased operating cost of the conventional
product) or gains (i.e., reduced operating costs of the green product). Participants were also
given the probability that the promoted outcomes would occur.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested in Experiment 2. Probability estimates were not
provided in Experiment 2. Rather, participants provided their own perceived probability that the
future outcomes would occur. All other conditions were identical to Experiment 1. Both
experiments were necessary to fully test the interaction between delay and probability.
Probability is expected to play a role in these types of decisions; however, in this particular
context, the effect of probability is expected to be minimal. Probabilities of savings or losses are
not generally provided to consumers, so Experiment 2 is more reflective of real scenarios.
However, a situation in which an individual evaluates the probability of an outcome and finds the
probability to be high should have an outcome that is identical to a situation in which an
individual does not evaluate probability. In other words, the behavioral response from a person
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who does not evaluate uncertainty is indistinguishable from a person who evaluates uncertainty
and finds none (i.e., an event is 100% probable). Experiment 1 attempted to show that
consumers do incorporate probabilities into their decisions while Experiment 2 attempted to
show that these probability evaluations were consistently high.
As noted above, risk and uncertainty have distinct meanings in the decision making
literature. Following these conventions, Experiment 1 is an assessment of risk (probabilities are
known) and Experiment 2 is an assessment of uncertainty (probabilities are unknown). Other
fields (e.g., actuarial science) identify risk as a function of probability and magnitude. Because
magnitude was also manipulated in this study, “risk” was not a proper term for a single variable.
Therefore, the term probability is used to describe the percentage of time that an event occurs. In
Experiment 1, probabilities are manipulated. In Experiment 2, participants’ subjective rating of
probability is referred to as confidence.
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CHAPTER VI
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 1
PARTICIPANTS
Relatively little work has investigated a priori sample size estimation for logistic
regression models (hypothesis tests in the current study are conducted via logistic regression),
especially for experimental designs (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). However, some rules of
thumb have been proposed for appropriate model fit. According to Peduzzi, Concato, Kemper,
Holford, and Feinstein (1996), the minimum number of events in a dichotomous outcome
variable must be at least 10 times the number of parameters in the model. In the current study,
the outcome variable of interest was the selection of the green product or conventional product.
The parameters in the model for Hypotheses 1 and 2 included three main effects (i.e., magnitude,
risk, and frame), three two-way interactions (i.e., all possible two-way interactions), and one
three-way interaction (i.e., magnitude x risk x frame). In order to test these seven parameters, at
least 70 participants must select the least frequent outcome option (i.e., green product or
conventional product).
Survey results (GfK, 2012) indicated that the preference for conventional products was
slightly greater than the preference for green products. Additionally, some of the conditions in
the current study were predicted to increase the preference for green products while other
conditions are predicted to increase the preference for conventional products. Therefore, it was
assumed that the overall selection of green and conventional products, collapsing across
conditions, would be nearly equal. If the number of green and conventional product selections
were equal then the minimum required sample size would be 140 participants (i.e., 70 instances
of a green product selection and 70 instances of a conventional product selection; Peduzzi et al.,
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1996). To allow for flexibility in the outcome variable, 200 participants were recruited for
Experiment 1.
Participants were recruited using Amazon’s crowdsourcing tool, Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). MTurk workers are paid small sums to perform Human Intelligence Tasks (HIT).
Each HIT is posted on the MTurk website and workers must choose to participate. Upon
completion of the task, experimenters may choose to manually or automatically pay workers for
their time. Studies have indicated that samples of participants using MTurk are more
representative of the US population than convenience samples collected with university
undergraduates (Berinsky, 2012). Additionally, a college student sample was reasoned to be
detrimental to generalizability. The experimental task involved the hypothetical purchase of
household goods. Many college students were presumed to have little experience purchasing
water heaters or light bulbs. Results from a college student sample would not appropriately
reflect the purchase decisions of actual consumers.
Within one day of posting the HIT online, 219 MTurk workers had participated in the
experiment. The average age of participants was 37.19 years (SD = 12.04). Participants were
closely split between females (54%) and males and the majority of participants identified their
racial/ethnic category as White/Caucasian (76%). Just under half (48%) of participants had
attained at least a Bachelor’s degree and the median annual income range was $40,000 - $49,999.
Finally, most (57%) participants were either home owners or lived in a home that was owned by
another member of the household (Table 1). All participants who successfully completed the
study were compensated $0.25 for their time.
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Table 1
Participant Demographics

Gender
Female
Male
Prefer not to answer
Race/Ethnicity
White
Hispanic
Black
Asian
American
Indian/Alaska
Native
Middle
Eastern/North
African
Housing Status
Own
Rent
Occupied without
rent
Education
Did not finish high
school
High school
diploma
Some college
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Some graduate
school
Master’s degree
Professional degree
(e.g., MD, JD)
Doctorate

Experiment 1
N

Experiment 2
n

111
91
2

122
90
0

165
10
25
10
6

158
11
25
26
3

1

1

116
80
7

122
87
5

2

1

22

23

59
23
68
5

60
19
66
3

20
2

33
3

3

7
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MATERIALS
PRODUCT CHOICE. The primary experimental task required participants to choose
between a green product and its conventional counterpart. Participants were first given the
following instructions:
Thank you for agreeing to participate. On the next screen you will be shown information
about two products. Please read all of the information--including the fine print. The
purchase price will be displayed below each product and information about energy costs
will be displayed above one of the products. You will be required to answer a few
questions about these products. Please read carefully. You will not be allowed to
continue if you answer incorrectly.
After reading the instructions, participants advanced to the next page of the online instrument
which displayed two products followed by three comprehension questions. The product
information included a brief description, purchase price, estimates of energy costs, and images of
each product (Figure 3). The size of each image was 500 x 500 pixels.
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(a)

Figure 3. Product choice options in Experiment 1. (a) Product choices in the low probability,
low magnitude, gain condition. (b) Product choices in the high probability, high magnitude, loss
condition.
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(b)

Figure 3 Continued.

Comprehension questions were included to ensure that participants were reading the
product information. The current experiment’s manipulation depended upon the participants
comprehending the given information. Participants answered multiple choice questions about
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the price of the conventional product (e.g., How much money does it cost to purchase the CFL
bulb?), the price of the green product (e.g., How much money does it cost to purchase the LED
bulb?), and a true or false question about the probability of future energy costs (e.g., The
MAJORITY of consumers who purchased the standard water heater paid higher energy costs
over 5 years.). Participants were required to answer all three questions correctly before
advancing to the next page and were allowed unlimited attempts to pass.
The product information displayed to participants varied across three dimensions:
magnitude, frame, and probability. Magnitude was represented by two classes of products.
Light bulbs represented low magnitude and water heaters represented high magnitude. In the
low magnitude condition, participants chose between a compact fluorescent light bulb (CFL) and
a light-emitting diode bulb (LED). LED bulbs generally have a higher initial cost but lower
operating costs. In the low magnitude conditions the CFL was presented with an initial cost of
$2.10 and the LED bulb with an initial cost of $3.99. The LED bulb was estimated to save
consumers $3.05 over five years. In the high magnitude conditions, participants chose between a
water heater with a standard storage tank and a water heater with a hybrid electric tank. The
standard storage tank water heater had an initial cost of $388.00 while the hybrid electric water
heater had an initial cost of $1200.00. The hybrid electric tank water heater was estimated to
save consumers $1082.00 over five years. All initial and operating costs are based on actual
costs from online retailers and Energy Star (www.energystar.gov) savings estimates.
For both magnitude conditions, the competing products were positioned as being
interchangeable. Each light bulb was a 60 watt equivalent and both water heaters had a 50 gallon
capacity. No additional information was provided about performance outside of the estimated
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energy costs. Additionally, logos and brand names were digitally removed from the products’
images to prevent brand recognition from influencing results.
Information about energy costs was framed as either a loss or a gain. The higher energy
costs of the conventional product were highlighted in the loss condition (i.e., consumers would
pay higher energy bills when purchasing the conventional product) and the lower energy costs of
the green product were highlighted in the gain condition. This information was positioned above
the corresponding product. In other words, messages in the loss frame were displayed near the
conventional product and messages in the gain frame were displayed near the green product.
Product messages also differed according to the probability of losses or gains. Each of
the savings or loss estimates was qualified with a probability of success. The advertised
differences in energy costs were said to be true for 90% of consumers or 10% of consumers. For
example, in the low probability condition participants were told the following: “10% of
consumers saved $3.05 in energy costs compared to consumers of CFLs. 90% of consumers did
not save on energy costs.” Note that this example comes from the low magnitude (i.e., light
bulbs rather than water heaters) gain condition (i.e., the message focused on potential savings
rather than additional costs). An example of a high probability message changes the order of the
probability estimates: “90% of consumers saved $3.05 in energy costs compared to consumers of
CFLs. 10% of consumers did not save on energy costs.” In the loss conditions the messages
referred to the probability of paying additional energy costs (e.g., “10% of consumers paid an
additional $3.05 in energy costs compared to consumers of LEDs. 90% of consumers did not
pay additional energy costs.”). The difference between high probability and low probability was
determined in reference to the probability of selecting the green product. For example, a 90%
probability of saving money by purchasing a green product was equivalent to a 90% chance of
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losing money by purchasing the conventional product. All else being equal, the high probability
condition favored the green product while the low probability condition favored the conventional
product. Probability estimates were displayed as a footnote (i.e., “fine print”) directly beneath
the estimate of the total saving or loss. A small group of graduate students piloted early versions
of the survey. The phrasing used throughout the final version incorporated this early feedback to
improve clarity of instructions and product messages.
Two sample conditions are displayed in Figure 3a,b. These samples comprise two of
eight possible conditions. The conditions in Figure 3 provide examples from each of the two
levels of magnitude, frame, and probability. All possible combinations of these three variables
were used in the experiment. Product choice was measured by the participants’ initial selection.
After correctly answering the comprehension questions, participants were shown the following
instructions: “Imagine that you must purchase one of the two products just shown. Which one
would you buy? Press NEXT to make your selection. You will have a chance to review the
products’ details before deciding.” These instructions were presented on their own page. After
advancing to the next page the product information was displayed once again and participants
had to fill a radio button with their desired purchase.
DISCOUNT RATE. To determine each participant’s discount rate, product choices
were made six times, including the initial selection. After the initial purchase decision, the initial
cost of the conventional product changed. The instructions for this section are presented below.
Note that these instructions are taken from the low magnitude condition. Instructions for the
high magnitude condition replaced “CFL” with “standard storage tank.”
On the following pages you will be asked to decide between these products once
again. However, the price of the CFL has changed. All of the other information will
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remain the same.
You will decide between these products 5 more times. The price of the CFL will change
each time. Try not to be influenced by your previous choices. Only consider the
available information when making your decisions. In other words, treat each decision
like you were seeing the products for the first time.
The price of the conventional product on each iteration of this task changed according to
the participant’s previous selection. The goal of this procedure was to determine the
participant’s indifference point—the price at which the participant would be equally satisfied
with either product. If the participant chose the green product then the cost of the conventional
product reduced by one-half, making the conventional product more appealing. If the participant
selected the conventional product then the cost of the conventional product increased by one-half
of the difference between the green and conventional product. Table 2 displays the choices from
a sample participant over all six iterations.

Table 2
Sample Data Determining One Participant’s Indifference Point
Trial
Conventional ($)
Green ($)
1
388*
1200
2
794
1200*
3
591*
1200
4
692.50*
1200
5
743.25
1200*
6
717.88
1200*
Note. * indicates participant’s choice on individual trial. Immediate rewards
were adjusted after each selection.
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The participant chose the conventional product ($388) on the first trial so on the second trial the
initial cost of the conventional product was increased to $794 (halfway between $388 and
$1200). On trial two the participant opted for the green product. The initial cost of the
conventional product was decreased to the midway point between $388 and $794. The
participant had indicated a preference for the conventional product at $388 (trial 1) and a
preference for a green product when the conventional product was $794 (trial 2). At this point
the participant had provided a temporary upper and lower bound (i.e., any conventional product
priced $388 or less would be preferred over the green product and any conventional product
priced at $794 or more would lead to a preference for the green product). Nothing is known
about preferences when conventional product in between $388 and $794. The degree of
uncertainty between the upper and lower bound is halved after the choice on trial 3 and each
successive trial after.
The indifference point was calculated after the sixth trial. Based on the sixth selection,
the indifference point was determined by what would have been the price of the conventional
product on the seventh trial. For example, the participant in Table 2 chose the green product in
the sixth trial, indicating that the new upper bound was $717.88 (i.e., the green product would be
chosen any time the conventional product was $717.88 or higher). The last selection for the
conventional product was on trial 4 ($692.50). Therefore, the indifference point for this
participant was $705.19 (halfway between $692.50 and $717.88). This procedure could
theoretically be repeated indefinitely. Each trial increases the precision of the indifference point.
Only six trials were used in the current study to reduce participant fatigue and because six trials
provided variability among participants without losing meaningful differences between prices.
Calculating the indifference point down to the nearest dollar or cent would require having
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participants choose between green and conventional products which were nearly identical in
price (e.g., a trial with a $700 conventional product followed by a trial with a $701 conventional
product). This added precision was not reasoned to be worth the possible participant fatigue;
further, participants’ decisions and this level of detail were not expected to be reliable.
To determine the degree of discounting, Myerson, Green, and Warusawitharana’s (2001)
area under the curve method was employed. The area under the curve was calculated by first
converting the indifference point to a proportion of the future outcome. For example, the
indifference point in Table 2 was $705.19. To convert this value to the more familiar terms used
in previous studies, this indifference point was first subtracted from $1200, the initial cost of the
green product. Then, the immediate savings of the conventional product ($494.81) could be
compared to the future savings of the green product. The immediate value of the conventional
product was plotted on the y-axis as a proportion of the future value (494.81 / 1082 = 0.46). The
value on the x-axis was the proportion of the maximum delay. In the current study, only one
delay was given. Therefore, the value on the x-axis was one. With zero delay (x = 0) there is
also zero discounting, so the first point on the graph is (0, 1). Plotting a line from (0, 1) to (1,
0.46) creates a trapezoid. The area of this trapezoid, (x2 – x1) ((y1 + y2) / 2), provides an
indication of the degree of discounting. Lower values are indicative of greater discounting.
The area under the curve method provides a theoretically-neutral estimate of
discounting. In other words, area under the curve will be the same regardless of the underlying
discounting function (e.g., exponential or hyperbolic). In studies with multiple delays, this
method can be extended by adding successive trapezoids. For example, if participants were
asked to evaluate products with advertised savings in one and five years, then trapezoids could
be created by plotting indifference points at each time point. Area under the curve from time
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zero to one year would be added to the area from one year to five years. Because the current
study only assessed one value of delay, only one indifference point was plotted for each
participant. Additionally, the method described above is specific to the gain condition, but the
area under the curve can be applied to losses as well. For losses, the indifference point was not
subtracted from the cost of the green product. The loss condition compared an immediate
payment to a future payment. If the participant in Table 2 was in the loss condition then the
value of $705.19, rather than $494.81, would have been used to calculate the area under the
curve.
ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDES. Environmental attitudes were not included in any
specific hypotheses. The consumer survey which motivated the current study (GfK, 2012) found
that, in general, attitudes were not related to purchasing habits; the majority of consumers
preferred green products yet were hesitant to pay a premium for these products. The price of the
product appeared to be a bigger motivator of purchase decisions than attitudes. Furthermore, the
current study employed random assignment which is likely to distribute a range of environmental
attitudes across conditions. Finally, because of the applied focus of this study, the main variables
of interest were limited to those which could be directly manipulated by marketers.
Although not a part of any a priori hypotheses, a measure of environmental attitudes was
collected for exploratory purposes and for the possibility of additional explanatory power (i.e., to
determine if the primary manipulations explained purchase behavior above and beyond the effect
of environmental attitudes). Environmental attitudes were assessed via the New Ecological
Paradigm scale (NEP; Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000). The NEP is a 15-item scale
designed to measure the endorsement of an ecological worldview. According to Dunlap et al.
(2000), “the NEP items primarily tap ‘primitive beliefs’ about the nature of the earth and
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humanity’s relationship with it” (p. 427). The NEP, which is an updated version of the New
Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978), has shown evidence of predictive and
construct validity (e.g., a significant correlation (r = .57) with support for pro-environmental
policies) as well as internal consistency (α = .83; Dunlap et al., 2000).
Participants rated their level of agreement from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree) for 15 statements (e.g., Humans are severely abusing the environment). Even numbered
items were worded negatively (e.g., Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to
suit their needs) and were reverse-scored. Participants’ NEP scores were summed across all 15
statements. Results from study 1 indicated a Cronbach’s alpha of .869. Item-total correlations
ranged from .343 to .686 and removal of any single item reduced reliability.
Two additional items were added to the NEP scale. One item directed participants to
select mildly agree while another item directed participants to select mildly disagree. Incorrect
responses to these items indicated careless responding. The 15 items of the NEP scale as well as
the two attention check items were presented in the same order to all participants.
DEMOGRAPHICS. Participants also answered demographic questions including age,
gender, race/ethnicity/origin, housing status, income, and education. Age was an open response
question and gender was multiple choice among male, female, and prefer not to answer. The
question of race/ethnicity/origin was based on the proposed changes to the 2020 United States
census (Cohn, 2015). Rather than dividing race and ethnicity into two questions, participants
were asked, “Which categories best describe you? You may select more than one group.” Seven
categories were presented as well as an open response “other” category. Question phrasing and
response categories for housing status (“Which of the following describes your place of
residence?”), income (“What was your total household income for the past 12 months?”), and
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education (“What is the highest degree or level of school that you have completed?”) were all
modeled on the American Community Survey (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). Income response
categories ranged from less than $10,000 to $200,000 or more. Response categories for housing
status and education can be seen in Table 1. The entire instrument was developed and
administered via the Qualtrics survey management system.
PROCEDURE
The experiment was posted along with other available HITs on MTurk’s job board.
Prospective participants could read a brief summary of the task as well as the estimated
completion time and payment. If an MTurk worker wished to participate, they would accept the
HIT. By accepting the HIT, participants were given a link to the survey instrument as well as a
place to enter a completion code. Clicking the link opened the instrument in a new tab.
Participants first read a notification statement outlining the nature of the task, assurance
of anonymity, payment information, and research contact information. If they wished to proceed
they entered their MTurk identification number and advanced to the next page. The MTurk
identification number is a unique code assigned to each worker. This number allows workers to
identify participants while retaining participant anonymity. The next page of the survey included
product information and comprehension questions. Correctly answering all three comprehension
questions advanced participants to the product choice page. After making six product choices,
participants responded to the NEP and demographic items.
The last page included debriefing as well as a completion code. The completion code
was a randomly generated four digit code that was unique to each participant. These completion
codes were saved along with participant data. Participants were instructed to return to the
MTurk window in their web browser and enter the completion code in the space provided. At
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this point the participants could close the survey and submit the HIT via MTurk. The average
completion time was just over six minutes (M = 363.23 s, SD = 163.63 s) and times ranged from
143 to 2448 s.
Adding a unique completion code to the end of the survey allows researchers to identify
which participants made it through the entire instrument. Otherwise, participants could submit
the HIT without providing any data and would be paid without doing any work. Payment was
administered by matching the completion codes in the saved data with the completion codes
entered on MTurk. If a participant entered a code that matched one of the randomly generated
completion codes then that participant was paid. Payment was transferred automatically through
the Amazon interface after manually approving each respondent. Participants were typically
paid within two days of completing the experiment.
DESIGN
The independent variables were product category (magnitude), framing, and probability.
The dependent variables were product choices and area under the curve. All variables were
manipulated between subjects. Participants only saw one product category, one frame, and one
level of probability. Experiment 1 followed a 2 (low magnitude, high magnitude) x 2 (loss, gain)
x 2 (low probability, high probability) design which equates to eight total conditions.
Participants were randomly assigned to condition.
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CHAPTER VII
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 2
PARTICIPANTS
Recruitment procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1. However, all
MTurk workers from Experiment 1 were prevented from participating in Experiment 2. Two
hundred thirty-seven participants responded to the posting of Experiment 2. The majority of
participants were female (58%) and the average age was 36.53 years (SD = 12.40). Seventy-one
percent of participants identified as White/Caucasian and 52% had completed at least a
Bachelor’s degree. The median income range was $50,000 - $59,999. Most (57%) participants
were either home owners or lived in a home that was owned by another member of the
household (Table 1). All participants who successfully completed the study were compensated
$0.25 for their time.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
The materials and procedure from Experiment 1 were repeated with two major changes.
First, the probability manipulation was eliminated, leaving a 2x2 design in Experiment 2. In
Experiment 1 participants were informed of the probability that the savings/losses associated
with each product would be realized. In Experiment 2 participants were told that the estimates
were based on national averages (Figure 4). As in Experiment 1, light bulbs and water heaters
represented low and high magnitude products, respectively. Also, messages were framed in
terms of losses or gains.
Experiment 2 included two additional questions, not present in Experiment 1, that were
displayed immediately after participants made their first product selection. These items focused
on participants’ perceived confidence inherent in their purchase decisions as well as the level of
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control that participants felt over their energy costs. The confidence item was presented as a
slider ranging from 0% to 100%. Participants were instructed to indicate the chances that they

Figure 4. Product choice options in the low magnitude, loss condition (Experiment 2).

personally would achieve savings or losses at least as extreme as those previously displayed.
Instructions from the high magnitude/gain condition are presented below:
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The average consumer would save $1082 over five years by purchasing the hybrid
electric tank. Think about your own energy usage. If you purchased the hybrid
electric tank, what are the chances that you personally would save at least $1082 over
five years? Drag the bar below to indicate your answer from 0% to 100%.

0% = you definitely would not save as much as the average consumer
100 % = you definitely would save at least as much as the average consumer
The instructions differed according to condition. For example, in the loss condition, participants
were asked about their chances to pay an additional $1082 over five years by purchasing the
standard storage tank. Low probabilities in the loss condition (i.e., participants feel they are
likely to pay less than the average consumer) and high probabilities in the gain condition (i.e.,
participants feel they are likely to save more than the average consumer) indicated high
confidence. Therefore, values in the loss condition were reverse scored.
Next, participants responded to two items regarding their perceived level of control over
their energy costs: “You have some control over your energy costs” and “You have limited
influence over your energy costs.” Response options ranged from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5
(Strongly agree) with the latter item above being reverse scored. Both items as well as the
response options were adapted from Highhouse et al. (2002). The order of presentation of these
two items was randomized. All other elements of Experiment 1 that were not explicitly
mentioned here were duplicated in Experiment 2. These elements include the comprehension
questions, discount rate calculation procedure, NEP items (α = .733), attentional check items,
and demographics. Average completion time for Experiment 2 was just under eight minutes (M
= 465.31 s, SD = 355.58 s,) and times ranged from 138 to 3883 s.
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CHAPTER VIII
RESULTS: EXPERIMENT 1
Of the 219 initial respondents, 11 did not provide any usable data (i.e., they did not make
any purchase decisions). One participant failed both attention-check questions, indicating
careless responding; this participant’s data was also discarded. Participants’ response times were
examined for extreme values. One participant took just over four hours to complete the survey.
After removing this participants’ data, boxplots revealed eight additional outliers. Completion
times for these extreme cases ranged from 1188 seconds to 2448 seconds. These cases were
examined for response patterns or abnormalities (i.e., was response time related to any other
responses?) and none were found. Additionally, the removal of these data did not impact
hypothesis tests or substantially change the size of any effect. Therefore, only the extreme case
was removed. After this initial examination of the data, 206 participants were retained for
further analysis.
HYPOTHESES 1 AND 2
After removing problematic cases, group sizes ranged from 23 to 27 participants. Across
all conditions, 109 participants selected the conventional product (52.9%) while 97 selected the
green product (47.1%; Table 3). Because seven parameters were included in the following
hypothesis tests, the study was sufficiently powered (Peduzzi et al., 1996)
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Table 3
Product Choices by Condition in Experiment 1
High Probability
Frame
Loss
Gain
Conv.
Green
Conv.
Green
Magnitude
Low
7
20
7
19
High
9
18
12
14
Note. Conv. = conventional product

Low Probability
Loss
Gain
Conv.
Green
Conv.
Green
17
21

10
2

15
21

10
4

Taken together, hypotheses 1 and 2 stated that magnitude, risk, and frame should interact
when predicting purchase decisions. The outcome variable was dichotomous (0 = conventional
product, 1 = green product); thus, logistic regression analysis was used for hypothesis testing.
Each predictor variables was dummy coded: magnitude (0 = low, 1 = high), probability (0 = low,
1 = high), and frame (0 = loss, 1 = gain). Because the predictor variables were experimental
manipulations and because the outcome variable was dichotomous, univariate outliers were not
inspected. Additionally, multivariate outliers were not detected, but this finding was largely due
to the structure of the data. Values of distance, leverage, and influence are based on predicted
probabilities. Randomly assigning participants to conditions limited the range of predicted
probabilities. In other words, participants in the same experimental condition who selected the
same product had the same predicted probability (e.g., every participant in the low risk/low
magnitude/loss condition who selected the green product had identical distance, leverage, and
influence values).
Variables were entered into the logistic model in three blocks: main effects, two-way
interactions, and the three-way interaction. The overall model was statistically significant (α <
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.05) after entering the main effects in block one, χ2(3) = 45.34, p < .001. The overall model
remained statistically significant after entering the two-way interaction terms, χ2(6) = 48.00, p <
.001, but did not significantly improve the model over block one, χ2(3) = 2.67, p = .446. The
same pattern emerged in block three. Adding the three-way interaction did not significantly
improve the model, χ2(1) = 0.60, p = .438, yet the overall model remained statistically
significant, χ2(7) = 48.61, p < .001. Critically, the lack of a statistically significant probability x
magnitude x frame interaction provides no support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Because blocks two
and three did not contribute to model fit, only coefficients from block 1 were interpreted.
The variables of probability and magnitude had positive and negative relationships with
the log-odds of purchase decisions, respectively (Table 4). Participants were more likely to
choose the green product when probability was high and when magnitude was low. The odds of
selecting a green product in the low probability conditions were 0.15 that of the odds in the high
probability conditions. In other words, participants were 2.58 times more likely to select the
green product in the high probability condition than the low probability condition. The odds of
selecting a green product in the high magnitude conditions were 0.38 that of the odds in the low
magnitude conditions. Selection of the green product was 1.49 times more likely in the low
magnitude than high magnitude condition. Framing did not have a significant influence on
purchase decisions. Though the three-way interaction was not statistically significant,
hypothesis 2b made a specific prediction about a magnitude effect for gains in the low
probability condition. To assess these cell mean differences, a generalized linear model was fit
to the data. The proportion of participants selecting the green product in the low magnitude, low
probability, gain condition was .24 higher, 95% CI [.00, .48] than the proportion in the high
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magnitude, low probability, gain condition. The reported confidence interval does contain zero
when rounding to two decimal places, though the lower bound is technically greater than zero.

Table 4
Experiment 1 Logistic Regression Results Predicting Green Product Purchase by Probability, Magnitude, and Frame
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
β
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Odds Ratio
Wald
p
β (SE) Wald
p
β (SE) Wald
p
(SE)
[95% CI]
[95% CI]
[95% CI]
1.26
3.53
1.16
3.20
1.05
2.86
Intercept
15.38 <.001
7.47 .006
5.72 .017
(0.32)
[1.88, 6.60]
(0.43)
[1.37, 7.41]
(0.44)
[1.21, 6.77]

Probability

1.87
(0.32)

33.54 <.001

0.15
[0.08, 0.29]

1.79
(0.54)

10.90 .001

0.17
[0.06, 0.48]

1.58
(0.59)

7.10

.008

0.21
[0.06, 0.66]

Magnitude

-0.97
(0.32)

9.04

.003

0.38
[0.20, 0.71]

-0.57
(0.54)

1.09

.296

0.57
[0.20, 1.64]

-0.38
(.60)

0.35

.552

0.70
[0.22, 2.27]

Frame

-0.06
(0.31)

0.04

.838

0.94
[0.51, 1.73]

-0.28
(0.55)

0.25

.620

0.76
[0.26, 2.25]

-0.05
(0.62)

0.01

.934

0.95
[0.28, 3.22]

Prob. x
Magnitude

-0.88
(0.67)

1.73

.188

0.41
[0.11, 1.54]

-1.46
(1.03)

2.01

.156

0.23
[0.03, 1.75]

Prob. x Frame

0.58
(0.66)

0.79

.373

1.80
[0.50, 6.53]

0.18
(0.85)

0.04

.835

1.19
[0.23, 6.25]

Magnitude x
Frame

-0.08
(0.66)

0.02

.902

0.92
[0.26, 3.34]

-0.49
(0.84)

0.34

.563

0.61
[0.12, 3.20]

1.06
(0.44)

0.59

.441

2.87
[0.20, 42.24]
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Prob. x
Magnitude x
Frame
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DISCOUNT RATES
To facilitate comparison of the current study with the extant literature, participants’
discount rates were compared across conditions. As noted above, discounting was estimated by
the area under the curve method (Myerson et al., 2001) rather than relying on any theoretical
assumptions. Two participants did not complete the iterative choice procedure and their discount
rates could not be calculated. Univariate outliers were examined via boxplots and none were
detected. Therefore, 204 participants were included in the following analysis.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine the effect of probability,
magnitude, and frame (and their interactions) on participants’ delay discounting. Visual
inspection of Q-Q plots revealed that the residuals approximated normality. Levene’s test
indicated homogeneity of variance, F(7, 196) = 1.64, p = .127. Results of the ANOVA are
displayed in Table 5. A main effect of magnitude was observed with greater discounting in the
high magnitude (M = 0.76, SD = 0.19) than low magnitude (M = 0.84, SD = 0.25) condition.
Additionally, probability interacted with frame. When probabilities were high, gains were
discounted more steeply than losses. However, when probabilities were low, losses were
discounted more steeply than gains (Figure 5). Analysis of simple effects revealed that the
framing effect was statistically significant in the low probability, F(1,196) = 21.78, p < .001,
partial η2 = .100, and high probability, F(1,196) = 24.73, p < .001, partial η2 = .112, conditions.
Main effects of probability and frame were not statistically significant, nor were any other
interactions.
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Table 5
ANOVA Results of the Impact of Probability, Magnitude, and Frame, on Area Under the Curve
SS

df

MS

F

p

partial
η2

Probability

0.011

1

0.011

0.27

.606

.001

Magnitude

0.335

1

0.335

8.41

.004

.041

Frame

0.003

1

0.003

0.08

.774

<.001

Probability x Magnitude

0.001

1

0.001

0.03

Probability x Frame

1.852

1

1.852

46.48

Magnitude x Frame

0.012

1

0.012

0.31

Probability x Magnitude x
Frame

0.042

1

0.042

1.04

Error

7.809

196

0.040

Source

1

Area Under the Curve

0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5

Loss

0.4

Gain

0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Low

High
Probability

Figure 5. Area under the curve for two levels of probability and frame
(Experiment 1). Smaller values indicate greater discounting.

.867
<.001
.581
.308

<.001
.192
.002
.005
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EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
NEP. The impact of environmental attitudes on purchase decisions was explored by
adding scores on the NEP to the logistic regression model. Five participants did not respond to
over two-thirds of the items on the NEP. These participants were discarded from further
analysis. Three participants had missing data for one or two items. Missing values for these
participants were addressed via multiple imputation and analyses were pooled across five
imputations.
NEP scores ranged from 25 to 75 (M = 54.10, SD = 9.98). The distribution of scores
approached normality, with only a slight negative skew (skewness = -0.12). No univariate
outliers were detected. The logistic regression analysis described above was replicated but with
NEP scores entering the model first, before the main effects of probability, magnitude, and
frame. The purpose of this analysis was to determine if the experimental manipulations could
influence purchase decisions beyond individual attitudes. Multivariate outliers were addressed
prior to the regression analysis but none were found. The logistic model with only NEP scores
was not statistically significant, χ2(1) = 1.72, p = .190. Further analysis replicated the previous
finding without NEP scores in the model: only the main effects of probability, β = 1.85, p < .001,
and magnitude, β = -0.97, p = .003, were statistically significant. The odds ratio of probability
was 0.16, 95% CI [0.11, 0.22], while the odds ratio of magnitude was 0.38, 95% CI [0.27, 0.52].
A final logistic regression model tested potential interactions between environmental
attitudes (i.e., NEP scores) and experimental conditions (e.g., was the magnitude effect different
for people with low and high NEP scores?). Again, environmental attitudes had no impact on
product selections. Just like the previous analyses, only risk and magnitude affected product
choice. All interactions with environmental attitudes were not statistically significant (p > .05).
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DEMOGRAPHICS. Prior evidence has suggested that women are more likely than men
to endorse eco-friendly attitudes and behaviors (Brough, Wilkie, Ma, Isaac, & Gal, 2016;
Davidson & Freudenburg, 1996). Similar results were obtained in the current study. Women’s
scores on the NEP scale (M = 56.18, SD = 9.59) were significantly higher than men’s scores (M
= 51.74, SD = 9.90), t(198) = -3.21, p = .002, Cohen’s d = 0.46. No other demographic variables
were related to environmental attitudes.
To facilitate comparisons of other demographic variables, education and housing status
were recoded. Education was collapsed into three levels (completed high school or less,
education beyond high school through a Bachelor’s degree, completion of any post-Bachelor’s
education) and dummy coded with the Bachelor’s degree as the reference group. In the housing
status variable the “occupy without rent” category was removed due to its small sample size (n =
7), leaving only two groups (rented versus owned by a member of the household). Main effects
of gender, age, housing status, education, and income were not statistically significant predictors
or purchase decisions or discount rates (p > .05). Of particular interest was the income by
magnitude interaction. Presumably, current levels of income would differentially affect products
of high and low magnitudes. However, this interaction was also not statistically significant.
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CHAPTER IX
RESULTS: EXPERIMENT 2
Of the 237 initial respondents, only 220 provided usable data. As in Experiment 1, only
one participant failed both attention-check items. One participant’s response time (3883 s) was
nearly double that of the next longest response time (1999 s), a difference of more than 30
minutes. All other response times were within four minutes of the next highest value. After
removal of the extreme value, boxplots indicated the presence of five additional extreme outliers.
Examination of these cases did not reveal any abnormal response patterns. Following the
rationale presented in Experiment 1, these cases were retained. Thus, 218 participants remained
for further analysis.
HYPOTHESES 3 AND 4
Group sizes ranged from 53 to 56 participants. Across all groups, 81 participants selected
the conventional product (37.2%) while 137 selected the green product (62.8%). The proportion
of participants selecting the green product ranged from 56.6% in the high magnitude/loss
condition to 67.3% in the low magnitude/gain condition (Table 6). Average confidence ratings
were 52.22 (SD = 32.05) but values differed across condition (Table 7). Ratings of
controllability were relatively uniform across conditions (M = 7.68, SD = 1.56). No outliers
were detected for confidence or controllability ratings.
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Table 6
Product Choices by Condition in Experiment 2
Frame
Loss
Gain
Conv.
Green
Conv.
Green
Magnitude
Low
18
36
18
37
High
23
30
22
34
Total
41
66
Note. Conv. = conventional product

40

71

Total
Conv.
Green
36
45

73
64

81

137

Table 7
Confidence Ratings by Condition in Experiment 2
Frame
__Loss__
__Gain__
M
SD
M
SD
Magnitude
Low
27.48
26.88
72.25
24.91
High
44.77
27.24
63.43
29.35
Overall

36.05

28.30

67.80

__Total__
M
SD
50.01 34.22
54.36 29.73

27.48

Hypothesis 3 stated that, in the absence of explicit probability estimates, participants
would display high confidence in their ability to save money when purchasing the green product
(or to avoid losing money when purchasing the conventional product). Although no explicit
cutoff value was selected to determine the threshold of “high confidence,” one would predict a
negatively skewed distribution with a mean greater than 50% (i.e., most people believe that they
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have a greater-than-chance opportunity to outperform the projected losses or savings). As seen
in Figure 5, the distribution of scores centers around 50% and with very little skew (skewness = 0.09). These results do not support Hypothesis 3.

25

Frequency

20
15
10
5
0
0

5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Confidence

Figure 6. Distribution of confidence ratings in Experiment 2.

Interestingly, confidence values were higher in the gain conditions than the loss
conditions. These differences in confidence values were tested in a 2 (frame) x 2 (magnitude)
ANOVA. Visual inspection of residuals and Levene’s test, F(3, 216) = 0.95, p =.418, satisfied
assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance, respectively. Results of the ANOVA
indicated a significant main effect of frame, F(1, 216) = 75.18, p < .001, partial η2 = .258, and
frame by magnitude interaction, F(1, 216) = 13.67, p < .001, partial η2 = .060. The main effect
of magnitude was not statistically significant, F(1, 216) = 1.23, p = .251, partial η2 = .006.
Following up the significant interaction, simple effects analysis revealed that the effect of frame
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was stronger in the low magnitude condition, F(1, 216) = 76.48, p < .001, partial η2 = .261, than
the high magnitude condition, F(1, 216) = 12.37, p = .001, partial η2 = .054.
The fact that Hypothesis 3 was not supported weakened the rationale for Hypothesis 4.
However, the relationships between frame, magnitude, and product choice were still addressed in
Experiment 2. Logistic regression was conducted with two blocks of predictors. Like
Experiment 1, the main effects were entered in block 1 and interaction in block 2. The overall
model was not statistically significant after block 1, χ2(2) = 1.72, p = .422, or block 2, χ2(3) =
1.78, p = .618. Neither frame, magnitude, nor their interaction had any influence on product
selections (Table 8). Hypothesis 4 was not supported.

Table 8
Experiment 2 Logistic Regression Results Predicting Green Product Purchase by Magnitude and
Frame
Block 1
Block 2
β
Odds Ratio
β
Odds Ratio
Wald
p
Wald
p
(SE)
[95% CI]
(SE)
[95% CI]
Intercept

0.66
(0.25)

7.06

.008

1.92
[1.19, 3.12]

0.69
(0.29)

5.77

.016

2.00
[1.13, 3.52]

Magnitude

-0.36
(0.28)

1.60

.207

0.70
[0.40, 1.22]

-0.43
(0.40)

1.14

.285

0.65
[0.30, 1.43]

Frame

0.10
(0.28)

0.13

.718

1.11
[0.64, 1.92]

0.03
(0.41)

0.01

.946

1.03
[0.46, 2.28]

0.14
(0.56)

0.06

.801

1.1
[0.38, 3.48]

Magnitude x
Frame
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Confidence and controllability did not produce the expected effects, but their impact on
purchase decisions was analyzed by adding these variables to the logistic regression model.
Main effects and interactions were entered in separate blocks and the final model was
statistically significant, χ2(11) = 62.29, p < .001. Effects of frame, controllability, the magnitude
x frame interaction, and frame x controllability interaction were all statistically significant but
qualified by a higher-order interaction (Table 9). A significant frame x confidence interaction
indicated that increased confidence was related to an increased likelihood of selecting the green
product but only in the gain frame (Figure 7). The influence of controllability on green purchase
decisions depended upon magnitude and frame. As participants feelings of controllability
increased, the probability of choosing the green product decreased in the high magnitude, loss
condition but had no effect in the gain frame. In the low magnitude condition, increased feelings
of controllability were associated with an increased likelihood of purchasing the green product in
the loss frame and an opposite effect in the gain frame (Figure 8).
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Figure 7. Probability of selecting the green product in Experiment 2 as a
function of confidence and frame.
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Figure 8. Probability of selecting the green product in Experiment 2 as a
function of controllability in the low magnitude (a) and high magnitude
(b) conditions.

Table 9
Experiment 2 Logistic Regression Predicting Green Product Purchase by Magnitude, Frame, Confidence, and Controllability
Block 1
Block 2
Block 3
β
SE O.R.
[95% CI]
β
SE O.R.
[95% CI]
β
SE
O.R.
[95% CI]
1.17***

0.29

3.23

[1.83, 5.69]

0.73

0.39

2.08

[0.97, 4.46]

0.93*

0.46

2.54

[1.03, 6.24]

Magnitude

-0.51

0.30

0.61

[0.34, 1.09]

-0.49

0.44

0.61

[0.24, 1.58]

-0.67

0.55

0.51

[0.18, 1.50]

Frame

-0.62

0.35

0.54

[0.27, 1.07]

-1.12

0.62

0.33

[0.09, 1.10]

-1.37*

0.67

0.25

[0.07, 0.94]

Controllability

0.12

0.10

1.12

[0.93, 1.36]

0.24

0.16

1.28

[0.93, 1.75]

0.46*

0.19

1.59

[1.09, 2.32]

0.02***

0.01

1.02

[1.01, 1.04]

0.001

0.01

1.00

[0.98, 1.02]

0.002

0.01

1.00

[0.98, 1.03]

Mag x Frame

0.66

0.78

1.93

[0.42, 8.94]

-9.25

3.70

<.001

[0.00, 0.14]

Mag x
Controllability

-0.19

0.21

0.83

[0.55, 1.25]

-0.66*

0.28

0.52

[0.30, 0.89]

Mag x
Confidence

0.001

0.01

1.00

[0.98, 1.03]

-0.01

0.02

0.99

[0.96, 1.02]

Frame x
Controllability

-0.27

0.23

0.77

[0.49, 1.20]

-1.00**

0.38

0.37

[0.18, 0.78]

0.07***

0.02

1.07

[1.04, 1.10]

0.07**

0.02

1.07

[1.02, 1.12]

1.34**

0.50

3.83

[1.45, 10.2]

0.01

0.03

1.01

[0.95, 1.07]

Intercept

Confidence

Frame x
Confidence

60

Mag x Frame x
Controllability
Mag x Frame x
Confidence
Note. Mag = magnitude. * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001
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DISCOUNT RATES
As in Experiment 1, discount rates were calculated according to the area under the curve
(Myerson et al., 2001). Because confidence scores were continuous, the degree of discounting
was assessed in a linear regression. One participant did not complete the iterative choice
procedure and was excluded from analysis. No univariate outliers were detected. Two cases
were identified as potential multivariate outliers, but these data had very little overall impact on
parameter estimates. Results of hypothesis tests did not differ when the cases were included or
excluded, so these cases remained in the data set. Residuals approached normality and the
assumption of homoscedasticity was also satisfied. The maximum value of the variance inflation
factor was 4.45, so multicollinearity was not problematic.
Main effects of frame, magnitude, and confidence (mean centered) were entered into the
first block of the regression model followed by all two-way interactions in block two and the
three-way interaction in block three. The overall model was statistically significant after blocks
one and two but block three did not explain additional variance, ΔF(1, 210) = 0.55, p = .459, ΔR2
= .002. After dropping the three-way interaction, the overall model remained statistically
significant, F(6, 211) = 14.51, p < .001, R2 = .292. High magnitude products were discounted
more than low magnitude products, but this main effect was qualified by a frame x magnitude
interaction (Table 10). The effect of magnitude was larger for losses than gains. An interaction
between confidence and frame was also statistically significant. Confidence decreased
discounting for gains but had little effect on losses (Figure 9).
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Table 10
OLS Regression Results of the Impact of Magnitude, Frame, and Confidence on Area
Under the Curve
B
SE B
β
t
Intercept

0.89

0.030

Magnitude

-0.12

0.038

-0.31

-3.27**

Frame

-0.02

0.044

-0.04

-0.41

0.0003

0.001

0.06

0.46

0.15

0.056

0.33

2.69**

0.0002

0.001

-0.02

-0.25

0.01

0.001

0.40

4.44***

Confidence
Magnitude x Frame
Magnitude x Confidence
Frame x Confidence

27.01***

Note. ** p < .01; ** p < .001

1.2

Area Under the Curve

1
0.8
0.6
0.4

Loss
Gain

0.2
0
0

100
Confidence

Figure 9. Interaction of frame and confidence on area under the curve
(Experiment 2). Lower values indicate greater discounting.
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EXPLORATORY
NEP. The impact of participants’ environmental attitudes was again addressed by
incorporating NEP scores into the analysis of product choices. Two participants did not respond
to any NEP items and were excluded. Three other participants were missing responses for one to
three items. These data points were estimated using the same multiple imputation procedure
described in Experiment 1. Additionally, no multivariate outliers were detected. NEP scores
ranged from 27 to 66 and were approximately normally distributed (skewness = -0.31).
Using logistic regression analysis, mean-centered NEP scores were entered in the first
block, followed by main effects and interactions in blocks two and three, respectively.
Environmental attitudes were statistically significant predictors of product choices: χ2 tests of the
model containing NEP scores and the intercept reached significance for each imputation (p <
.01). Wald tests of individual parameter estimates were also statistically significant (p < .01)
across all imputations for NEP scores, βpooled = 0.06, SEpooled = 0.02, and the intercept, βpooled =
0.56, SEpooled = 0.14. For participants with average NEP scores (M = 51.23, SD = 7.51), the
probability of selecting the green product was 63.60%. For participants with NEP scores one
standard deviation above the mean, the probability of selecting the green product was 72.53%.
The addition of experimental variables (i.e., frame, magnitude) and interaction terms did not
significantly contribute to the model (p > .05).
DEMOGRAPHICS. Unlike Experiment 1, environmental attitudes did not differ across
genders in Experiment 2. Scores on the NEP scale were approximately equal for men (M =
51.25, SD = 7.66) and women (M = 51.52, SD = 7.30), t(210) = -0.27, p = .791, Cohen’s d =
0.04. Gender was also not predictive of product choices when entered in a logistic regression
model alone, χ2(1) = 0.02, p = .898, as a two-way interaction terms, χ2(3) = 0.13, p = .127, or as
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an interaction with both frame and magnitude, χ2(1) = 0.35, p = .554. As in Experiment 1, no
other demographic variables were significant predictors of purchase decisions or discount rates.
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CHAPTER X
DISCUSSION
For a certain class of green products, higher initial costs are offset by the prospect of
future savings. However, these future savings are not guaranteed; they are probabilistic. How an
individual operates a new product influences the payoff. For example, an energy efficient light
bulb may advertise a specific reduction in energy bills, but actual savings are dependent upon an
individual’s use. The monetary benefits of “going green” are therefore subjected to two major
factors: delay and probability. The current research investigated how these two factors combined
to influence purchase decisions for green products.
For years, psychologists and economists have studied delay and probabilistic discounting
in simple monetary decisions (Frederick et al., 2002; Green & Myerson, 2010; Loewenstein &
Prelec, 1992). These studies have largely isolated either delay or probability, yet many realworld decisions incorporate both factors. Only recently (Vanderveldt et al., 2015) have scholars
begun to systematically examine the influence of delay in probabilistic choices (and vice versa).
The application of delay and probabilistic discounting to green purchase decisions is a logical fit,
but one that is thus far missing from the literature.
Delay and probability have been found to interact with one another (Vanderveldt et al.,
2015) such that an increase in delay decreases the impact of probability while a decrease in
probability (i.e., the outcomes are less likely) decreases the impact of delay. Also, delay and
probability are each moderated by frame and magnitude (Estle et al., 2006; Green and Myerson,
2010). A framing effect occurs when a change in the wording of a decision elicits a different
preference (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In the current study, frame was manipulated by
presenting messages about the losses associated with conventional products (i.e., increased

66
energy bills relative to green products) or the gains associated with green products (i.e., reduced
energy bills relative to conventional products). Magnitude refers to the size of losses or gains.
In the current study, light bulbs (low magnitude) and water heaters (high magnitude) represented
two levels of magnitude. Both framing and magnitude have been shown to differentially impact
delay and probabilistic discounting (Estle et al., 2006; Green & Myerson, 2010). Based on the
extant literature, specific hypotheses were formulated regarding the impact of delay and
probability, as well as the moderating influences of frame and magnitude, in green purchase
decisions. These hypotheses were empirically tested in a series of two experiments.
Hypotheses 1 and 2, when combined, posited that probability, frame, and magnitude
would interact. In other words, a frame by magnitude interaction would vary across levels of
probability. When probabilities were high, framing was expected to have opposite effects in the
low and high magnitude conditions. Specifically, the purchase of the green product was
expected to be associated with the loss frame for low magnitude products and the gain frame for
high magnitude products. When probabilities were low (i.e., a 10% chance of recouping the
savings associated with the green product), participants were expected to opt for the green
product more often in the loss frame than the gain frame. However, within the gain frame,
inexpensive green products were expected to be chosen more often than expensive green
products.
The three-way interaction between probability, frame, and magnitude was not statistically
significant. Thus, hypotheses 1 and 2 were not fully supported. When the projected savings of
the green product were 90% certain, framing effects were not observed in the low or high
magnitude conditions. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. As predicted, a magnitude effect
did occur in the gain frame. Participants were more likely to choose the low magnitude green
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product than the high magnitude green product. However, this same magnitude effect was
unexpectedly present in the loss frame.
Although probability, frame, and magnitude did not interact as expected, probability and
magnitude had considerable influence on participants’ decisions. When participants were told
that the differences in operating costs were 90% certain (high probability conditions), nearly
67% of participants opted for the green product. When the differences in operating costs were
10% certain (low probability conditions), only 26% of participants chose the green product. This
result is not surprising. When comparing initial costs, the conventional product has the
advantage. The monetary advantage of the green product lies in its reduced operating costs.
Participants were deciding between the guaranteed benefit of a conventional product and a
probabilistic benefit of the green product. When the benefits associated with the green product
were more likely, participants were more likely to select the green product.
Across levels of probability and frame, participants were also more likely to select the
green product in the low magnitude conditions. When choosing between an LED and CFL bulb,
56.2% opted for the green product (i.e., the LED). When choosing between a standard and
hybrid electric water heater, 37.6% opted for the green product (i.e., the hybrid electric).
Discounting was greater for relatively expensive products than inexpensive products. This
finding is consistent with previous research on losses but not gains (Benhabib et al., 2010; Estle
et al., 2006; Hardisty et al., 2013; Mitchell & Wilson, 2010). Notably, framing had no effect on
participants’ choices.
One possible explanation of the main effect of magnitude, and why it did not interact
with frame, is that the framing manipulation was not effective. The differences in frames were
only manipulated for the delayed outcomes. In other words, the operating costs were subject to

68
the framing manipulation but the initial costs were not. For example, participants in the low
magnitude conditions were told that the LED bulb could produce a savings of $3.05 over five
years that the CFL bulb could produce a loss of $3.05 over five years. In both the gain and loss
conditions participants were told that the initial price of the CFL was $2.10 and the initial price
of the LED was $3.99. Therefore each purchase, regardless of frame, was subject to at least one
loss (i.e., the initial cost). Previous research on “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1985) suggests that
people prefer to integrate multiple losses into a single mental transaction. If the loss frame
became salient when comparing the initial costs of each product, participants may have evaluated
each decision based on the total amount that they stood to lose, even in the gain conditions.
One critical prediction in the current study was that consumers would be sensitive to the
probabilistic nature of green purchase decisions. The main effect of probability in Experiment 1
supported the idea that consumers evaluated this factor when making decisions. However,
information presented in Experiment 1 was not reflective of real-world product choices. By law,
when estimated energy costs are provided, these costs must reflect typical product use.
Experiment 2 attempted to capture the impact of delay and probabilistic discounting in a task that
was higher in ecological validity.
In Experiment 2, potential losses and gains were not presented with probability estimates.
Rather, participants were told that the losses or gains were typical of the average consumer.
Probability estimates were inferred by each participant. They were asked to provide their own
rating of the likelihood of future savings or losses. This rating was conceptualized as an
indication of confidence. Past research has demonstrated that people overestimate the likelihood
that positive events will happen to them (unrealistic optimism; Shepperd et al., 2013) and events
are viewed as being less risky when individuals have control over the outcomes (Highhouse et
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al., 2002). Based on these findings, participants were expected to perceive the purchase of a
green product as being low-risk (high confidence). When product messages were framed as
savings, participants were expected to be overly confident in their ability to save at least as much
as advertised. In the loss frame, participants were expected to rate themselves as being less
likely than average to lose as much as the advertised value. These self-ratings of confidence
would then align with the high probability conditions in Experiment 1.
Participants in Experiment 2 did not display unrealistic optimism. Therefore, hypothesis
3 was not supported. Unexpectedly, the confidence ratings were dependent upon experimental
condition. Participants were more confident in their ability to save money than they were in their
ability to not lose money. This effect was stronger for low magnitude products (light bulbs) than
high magnitude products (water heaters). Rather than experiencing unrealistic optimism,
participants appeared to think that the product messages, regardless of frame, would apply to
them. In order to compare scores across conditions, confidence values in the loss frame were
reverse scored (i.e., a low probability of losing money was treated equivalently to a high
probability of saving money). Without reverse scoring, confidence values were nearly equal in
each condition. For example, the average likelihood of paying an additional $3.05 when
purchasing the CFL was 73%. The average likelihood of saving $3.05 by purchasing the LED
was 72%. These results suggest that participants assumed the advertised value would apply to
their own energy usage, regardless of frame. Participants expected their own energy costs to be
comparable to that of the average consumer.
Hypothesis 4 stated that participants’ unrealistic optimism and controllability ratings in
Experiment 2 would lead to choices that mimicked the high probability conditions of Experiment
1. Although participants did not experience unrealistic optimism, the effects of frame and
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magnitude were examined in Experiment 2 as well. Neither frame, magnitude, nor their
interaction had an influence on product choices. Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
The model in Figure 2 shows that probability and delay were proposed to interact.
However, the expected ceiling effect of probability ratings was thought to minimize the influence
of probability. Because the ceiling effect was not observed, the impact of varying levels of
probability on purchase decisions could be tested. A significant frame by confidence interaction
was observed. In the loss frame, increasing confidence had very little effect on the overall
likelihood of purchasing a green product. In the gain frame, increasing confidence was
associated with an increased likelihood of selecting the green product. In other words,
participants who were more confident that they would save the advertised amount by going green
were more likely to select the green product. This finding is consistent with prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The benefit of the green product
(i.e., future savings) is risky because the savings are not guaranteed. The benefit of the
conventional product (i.e., reduced initial price) is less risky because the initial price is
guaranteed. In the gain frame, people are traditionally risk averse—they prefer certain gains. In
Experiment 2, when participants viewed the green product as risky (i.e., less confidence in the
savings being recouped), they preferred the certain gain of the green product. As subjective risk
evaluations decreased, the likelihood of selecting the risky green product increased.
The subjective likelihood that participants would lose money by selecting the
conventional product did not impact purchase decisions. According to prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), people are risk seeking in the loss
frame. They are willing to take chances to avoid a loss. Prospect theory can partially explain the
loss frame of Experiment 2 as well. Participants who rated themselves as more likely to lose
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money by purchasing the conventional product were willing to take risks (i.e., purchase the green
product) to avoid this loss. The unexplained cases are the participants who rated themselves as
unlikely to lose money by purchasing the conventional product. If these participants did not
think that they would lose money when purchasing the conventional product, then a comparison
of initial prices should favor the purchase of the conventional product. This view of participants’
decision processes is undoubtedly overly simplistic. Participants in the loss condition were
asked about the likelihood that they would lose at least as much as the advertised amount. Even
participants who were certain that they would lose less than advertised, who were rated as highly
confident in Experiment 2, still may have assumed some degree of loss. In other words,
participants may have been 95% confident that they would lose less than $1082 by purchasing a
conventional water heater, but they may still associate the conventional product with a loss
anywhere in the range from $0 to $1081. These participants may have still been risk seeking to
avoid losses even if the loss was not expected to be of the advertised magnitude. Another
possibility is that these high-confidence participants did not expect to lose as much money with
the conventional product because they generally practice eco-friendly behavior. These
participants may have been more likely in general to purchase green products regardless of
potential savings or losses.
Finally, controllability was expected to contribute to the ceiling effect in subjective
probability (confidence) ratings, but controllability and confidence were not related.
Controllability did have an effect on purchase decisions, though. When comparing water
heaters, increased feelings of controllability decreased the likelihood of selecting the green
product, but only in the loss frame. No effect was observed in the gain frame for water heaters.
When comparing light bulbs, controllability had opposite effects for losses and gains. Increased
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controllability increased the likelihood that participants selected the green product in the loss
frame. However, increased controllability decreased the likelihood that participants selected the
green product in the gain frame. Past research indicated that negative outcomes are seen as
being less likely when people perceive increased control over those outcomes. The findings of
Experiment 2 did not align with these predictions.
Taken together, results of experiments 1 and 2 offer a number of insights into green
purchase behavior. First, the probability of the future outcome, whether explicitly provided or
subjectively rated by participants, was a major factor in purchase decisions. While the
predictions in Figure 2 were not fully supported, the results of the current study do support the
inclusion of probability into a model of green purchase decisions. Second, participants were
responsive to the advertised future outcomes. In Experiment 1, the pattern of results suggested
that participants were largely basing their decisions on future outcomes. People were in favor of
the green product when the probability of future savings was high and were in favor of the
conventional product when the probability of future savings was low. In Experiment 2, the
majority of participants believed that they were likely to experience the advertised outcome,
regardless of frame. When participants were told that the average consumer paid extra money
over time by purchasing the conventional product, the majority of participants believed that they
were likely to experience similar or greater losses. When participants were told that the average
consumer would save money over time by purchasing the green product, the majority of
participants believed that they were likely to experience similar or greater savings.
Any conclusions about other variables should be made with reservation. Magnitude, for
example, was a significant predictor of purchase decisions in Experiment 1 but not in
Experiment 2 even though the magnitude manipulation was the same in both experiments.
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Environmental attitudes were predictive of decisions in Experiment 2 but not in Experiment 1.
In Experiment 2, controllability interacted with magnitude and frame, but in a manner
inconsistent with previous work. Demographic variables were not predictive of purchase
decisions in either experiment. More work is needed to accurately assess the influence of these
factors in green purchase decisions.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS: GREEN MARKETING
The results of the current study have implications for marketers of green products. First,
participants did appear to base their decisions on future outcomes. Participants were not making
decisions based solely on the initial price of each product. Consumers have indicated that the
higher cost of green products can be prohibitive to their purchase (GfK, 2012), but highlighting
the operating cost may help people overcome this obstacle. Another finding related to product
labels was that participants were mostly convinced that the advertised operating costs would be
applicable in their own situation. In Experiment 2, operating costs were labeled as consumer
averages. Previous research has suggested that people tend to believe that they will outperform
the average. However, the current study found that people were not overly optimistic when
predicting their own energy usage. Overall, prior beliefs about individual energy use did not
appear to affect how participants perceived the product messages. If a product advertised losses
over five years, then participants felt that those losses would apply to them. If a product
advertised savings over five years, then participants felt that those savings would apply to them.
Although most participants felt that the advertised savings or losses were likely to occur,
ratings of probability did impact purchase decisions. Increasing consumer confidence in the
financial benefits of green products will increase the likelihood that these products are
purchased. When consumers perceive potential losses they will employ risk reduction strategies.
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Consumers frequently rely on branding information such as image or loyalty (Johnson &
Bruwer, 2004; Roselius, 1971; Yeung, Yee, & Morris, 2010), but they may also engage in
information-seeking behavior (Beatty & Smith, 1987; Murray, 1991). In a retail setting,
knowledgeable employees may be able to reduce these levels of perceived risk. Additionally,
access to efficiency information, such as the results of government or private testing, may
increase the likelihood that the green product is purchased.
Of all the variables in the current study, frame is the easiest to manipulate by marketers.
Unfortunately, framing did not have a consistent impact on purchase decisions. In both
experiments, the purchase of the green product was equally likely in the loss and gain frame.
Frame did interact with confidence in Experiment 2. When consumer confidence is low,
utilizing the loss frame will increase the preference for green products. When confidence is
high, the gain frame will increase the preference for green products (Figure 2). Based on these
results, framing can only be properly utilized when additional information (i.e., confidence) is
present. Unless marketers can accurately assess the level of consumer confidence, framing is not
a viable strategy. However, changing the way in which frame is manipulated may produce
different results (see limitations below).
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: DISCOUNT RATES
The hypotheses in the current study were focused on the impact of discounting on a
single purchase, but most of the previous research has been about the amount of discounting
under different conditions. Discount rates were collected in the current study to facilitate
comparisons with previous research. These results are discussed here.
The current study contributed to the relatively sparse literature on the combination of
delayed and probabilistic discounting. This study was one of the first to examine the interaction
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of delay and probability for losses and gains of different magnitudes. When probabilities were
low, discounting was greater for gains than losses. When probabilities were high, discounting
was greater for losses than gains. The same effect emerged when probability was given
(Experiment 1) or inferred by the participant (Experiment 2). Although these results provide
further evidence of an interactive effect between delay and probability, the effects were not
observed in the predicted direction. The results of Vanderveldt and colleagues’ study suggested
that as certainty increased the effect of probability diminished, leaving only the effect of delay.
Research on delay discounting has found that gains are discounted more than losses but that
frame and magnitude interact. In both of the current experiments, as certainty (probability)
increased, discounting was greater in the loss frame than gain frame—the opposite effect found
in previous studies. Additionally, the impact of magnitude on discount rates was minimal
compared to the extant literature. In Experiment 2, consistent with prior work, large losses were
discounted more than small losses. However, no effect of magnitude was found in the gain
frame. These results are inconsistent with a present bias explanation of discounting (Hardisty et
al., 2013).
Vanderveldt et al. (2015) found that, when probability and delay were combined,
probability appeared to be the most influential factor (i.e., the effect of probability on delay was
greater than the effect of delay on probability). However, due to methodological concerns, the
authors could not rule out the potential of this result being an experimental artifact. The current
study also found probability to be an overwhelmingly influential factor, but suffers from the
same methodological concerns as Vanderveldt et al. More research is needed to systematically
examine this interaction.
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LIMITATIONS
One of the most obvious limitations of the current study is the simulated nature of the
experimental task. Participants did not have to use their own money. Previous research has
shown that discount rates are approximately equal in studies with real or hypothetical scenarios
(Johnson & Bickel, 2013; Lagorio & Madden, 2005), but these studies did not require
participants to lose a large magnitude of money. No controlled study will require participants to
spend $1200 of their own money, so the generalizability of these results is somewhat limited.
However, the distribution of product choices was not extreme in favor of one product or the
other. If participants were not influenced by cost then other factors, such as social desirability,
would have presumably led to an unequal distribution of product choices.
A critical limitation in the current study was the framing manipulation. As noted above,
in every experimental condition participants were forced to consider at least one loss when
evaluating the initial price of each product. Regardless of the future savings or losses that were
highlighted, purchasing a product required the loss of money. Participants may have mentally
restructured the alternatives in the gain frame to focus on potential losses (Thaler, 1985). One
solution is to frame the initial costs in terms of savings or losses instead of leaving the
differences to be framed by the participant. For example, the initial costs of the conventional and
green water heaters were $388 and $1200, respectively. Rather than listing the two separate
initial costs, the gain frame would indicate that the conventional product provides an immediate
$812 savings while the green product provides a $1082 saving over five years. In the loss frame,
the green product would be listed as an immediate $812 payment and the conventional product
as a $1082 payment over five years.

77
FUTURE RESEARCH
Testing a new framing manipulation, described in the previous section, is one direction
for future research. However, the type of scenarios presented in the current study should not be
abandoned. It is worth investigating how consumers are conceptualizing these decisions. When
comparing two products, are consumers viewing the initial costs relative to one another (i.e.,
subtracting one price from the other) or individually? Additionally, how are consumers framing
the initial and future costs? When the savings associated with green products are advertised,
consumers may be associating the initial cost with a loss and the reduced operating cost as a
gain. Thus far, research on intertemporal choice has focused on the comparison of immediate
versus future gains and immediate versus future losses. Scenarios that combine multiple frames
into one decision (e.g., how much are consumers willing to lose up front for a future gain) might
be the best way to study green products.
Another avenue of future research involves the interaction of probability and delay. The
results of this study indicated that probability does affect decisions with delayed outcomes, but
this interaction is still not well understood. To properly describe the probability x delay
interaction, varying levels of delay need to be systematically combined with levels of
probability. The current study only assessed a delay of five years in every condition.
Addressing multiple levels of delay would provide theoretical benefits by further examining the
probability x delay interaction, but would also allow marketers to optimize their product
messages. The benefits of a green product could be promoted at any point across the product’s
lifespan. For example, the reduced energy costs of a green water heater could be described as a
saving of $1082 over five years (the number used in the current study), $216 over one year,
$1514 over seven years, etc. Shorter delays highlight more immediate benefits while longer
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delays highlight a larger absolute value. What is the optimal combination of delay and
magnitude for changing consumer preferences?
Another factor that was not addressed in the current study is the environmental benefit of
green products. Only the financial benefits were manipulated. One prior study found that
environmental outcomes are discounted in a manner similar to monetary outcomes (i.e.,
immediate benefits are more valuable than future benefits; Hardisty et al., 2013), but the
purchase of green products has both financial and environmental consequences. The
environmental benefits were implied in the current study by reduced energy usage, but the
overall environmental benefits were not provided. To fully understand green purchase behavior,
both environmental and financial outcomes need to be explored.
Finally, the effects of controllability and confidence were not consistent with previous
research. Participants were not overly optimistic in their ability to outperform the average, and
controllability did not have a consistent effect on purchase behavior across frames and
magnitude. These unexpected effects could be specific to the context of green purchases, or they
could be the result of boundary conditions. For example, levels of confidence were high in the
gain frame and low in the loss frame. This effect may be specific to a consumer context and
mediated by another factor such as trust (Chen & Chang, 2013). An alternative explanation is
that confidence is susceptible to framing effects, regardless of context. Future research should
more carefully examine the role of these variables.
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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSIONS
The current study was one of the first to apply the principles of delay and probabilistic
discounting to green purchase decisions. Results of two experiments revealed that participants
were responsive to the probability of future rewards or losses. Selection of the green product
was more likely when probability was high, regardless of their how these probabilities were
estimated (i.e., explicit versus implicit). Marketers may increase the preference for green
products by reducing the uncertainty associated with future outcomes. These results support an
emerging area of research on the interaction of delay and uncertainty. Prior research has found
an influence of magnitude and frame on discounting behavior, but the current study did not
reveal any conclusive evidence about these variables in the context of green purchase decisions.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENT 1 PROTOCOL
Page
1. Notification statement: omitted
2. Instructions: Thank you for agreeing to participate. On the next screen you will be
shown information about two products. Please read all of the information--including the
fine print. The purchase price will be displayed below each product and information
about energy costs will be displayed above one of the products.
You will be required to answer a few questions about these products. Please read
carefully. You will not be allowed to continue if you answer incorrectly.
3. Comprehension check: questions, responses, and images varied by condition.
Sample items from the high magnitude, high probability, loss condition are shown
below.

90
Page
How much money does it cost to purchase the standard water heater?
$388
$1200
$1082
How much money does it cost to purchase the hybrid electric water heater?
$1200
$388
$1082
The MAJORITY of consumers who purchased the standard water heater paid higher
energy costs over 5 years.
True
False
4. Instructions: Imagine that you must purchase one of the two products just
shown. Which one would you buy? Press NEXT to make your selection. You will have
a chance to review the products' details before deciding.
5.

Which product would you purchase?
Standard storage tank - $388

Hybrid electric tank - $1200
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6. Instructions: Thank you for your selection. On the following pages you will be asked to
decide between these products once again. However, the price of the standard storage
tank has changed. All of the other information will remain the same.
You will decide between these products 5 more times. The price of the standard storage
tank will change each time. Try not to be influenced by your previous choices. Only
consider the available information when making your decisions. In other words, treat
each decision like you were seeing the products for the first time.
7-11. Iterative choice procedure: omitted
12. NEP Scale Instructions: Thank you for your responses thus far. Next, you will see
statements about the relationship between humans and the environment. For each one,
please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are UNSURE,
MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
15 NEP items were distributed across three pages. Two attentional check items
included. * denotes reverse scoring
13. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support
• Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs*
• When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences
• Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable*
• Humans are severely abusing the environment
14. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them*
• Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist
• The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern
industrial nations*
• Please select MILDLY AGREE for this question
• Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature
• The so-called "ecological crisis" facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated*
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15. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources
• Please select MILDLY DISAGREE for this question
• Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature*
• The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset
• Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to
control it*
• If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major
ecological catastrophe
16. Please answer the following questions about yourself.
Age (open response)
Gender
Female
Male
Prefer not to answer
Which categories best describe you? You may select more than one group.
White
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin
Black or African American
Asian
American Indian or Alaska Native
Middle Eastern or North African
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Some other race, ethnicity, or origin ____________________
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16 (continued)
What was your total household income for the past 12 months?
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $44,999
$45,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,000
$150,000 to $199,999
$200,000 or more
Which of the following describes your place of residence? Check one
Owned by you or someone else who lives in the home. Include homes with and
without mortgages.
Rented
Occupied without rent
What is the highest degree or level of school that you have COMPLETED? Check one
Did not finish high school
High school diploma
Some college but no degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Some graduate work but no graduate degree
Master's degree
Professional degree beyond a Bachelor's (example: MD, JD)
Doctorate degree (example: PhD, EdD)
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17. Completion code and debriefing: omitted
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENT 2 PROTOCOL
Page
1. Notification statement: omitted
2. Instructions: Thank you for agreeing to participate. On the next screen you will be
shown information about two products. Please read all of the information--including the
fine print. The purchase price will be displayed below each product and information
about energy costs will be displayed above one of the products.
You will be required to answer a few questions about these products. Please read
carefully. You will not be allowed to continue if you answer incorrectly.
3. Comprehension check: questions, responses, and images varied by condition.
Sample items from the low magnitude, loss condition are shown below.
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How much money does it cost to purchase the LED bulb?
$3.99
$2.10
$3.05
How much money does it cost to purchase the CFL bulb?
$3.99
$2.10
$3.05
For the AVERAGE consumer, which product is associated with higher energy costs?
CFL
LED
4. Instructions: Imagine that you must purchase one of the two products just
shown. Which one would you buy? Press NEXT to make your selection. You will have
a chance to review the products' details before deciding.
5.

Which product would you purchase?
CFL - $2.10

LED - $3.99
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6.

Confidence: The average consumer would pay an additional $3.05 over five years by
purchasing the CFL bulb. Think about your own energy usage. If you purchased the
CFL bulb, what are the chances that you personally would pay at least $3.05 over five
years? Drag the bar below to indicate your answer from 0% to 100%.
0% = you definitely would not pay as much as the average consumer
100 % = you definitely would pay at least as much as the average consumer

Controllability: Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements.
Participants responded from Strongly disagree to Strongly agree on a five
point measure.
•
You have some control over your energy costs.
•
You have limited influence over your energy costs.
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7. Instructions: Thank you for your selection. On the following pages you will be asked to
decide between these products once again. However, the price of the CFL bulb has
changed. All of the other information will remain the same.
You will decide between these products 5 more times. The price of the standard storage
tank will change each time. Try not to be influenced by your previous choices. Only
consider the available information when making your decisions. In other words, treat
each decision like you were seeing the products for the first time.
8-12.

Iterative choice procedure: omitted

13. NEP Scale Instructions: Thank you for your responses thus far. Next, you will see
statements about the relationship between humans and the environment. For each one,
please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are UNSURE,
MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
15 NEP items were distributed across three pages. Two attentional check items
included. * denotes reverse scoring
14. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support
• Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs*
• When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences
• Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unlivable*
• Humans are severely abusing the environment
15. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them*
• Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist
• The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern
industrial nations*
• Please select MILDLY AGREE for this question
• Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature
• The so-called "ecological crisis" facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated*
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16. Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the environment.
For each one, please indicate whether you STRONGLY AGREE, MILDLY AGREE, are
UNSURE, MILDLY DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with it.
• The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources
• Please select MILDLY DISAGREE for this question
• Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature*
• The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset
• Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to
control it*
• If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major
ecological catastrophe
17. Please answer the following questions about yourself.
Age (open response)
Gender
Female
Male
Prefer not to answer
Which categories best describe you? You may select more than one group.
White
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin
Black or African American
Asian
American Indian or Alaska Native
Middle Eastern or North African
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Some other race, ethnicity, or origin ____________________
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17 (continued)
What was your total household income for the past 12 months?
Less than $10,000
$10,000 to $14,999
$15,000 to $19,999
$20,000 to $24,999
$25,000 to $29,999
$30,000 to $34,999
$35,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $44,999
$45,000 to $49,999
$50,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $74,999
$75,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $124,999
$125,000 to $149,000
$150,000 to $199,999
$200,000 or more
Which of the following describes your place of residence? Check one
Owned by you or someone else who lives in the home. Include homes with and
without mortgages.
Rented
Occupied without rent
What is the highest degree or level of school that you have COMPLETED? Check one
Did not finish high school
High school diploma
Some college but no degree
Associate's degree
Bachelor's degree
Some graduate work but no graduate degree
Master's degree
Professional degree beyond a Bachelor's (example: MD, JD)
Doctorate degree (example: PhD, EdD)
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18. Completion code and debriefing: omitted
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